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War	  strategizing	  is	  a	  long	  and	  complicated	  process	  that	  requires	  extensive	  planning	  and	  analysis.	  Many	  different	  factors	  come	  into	  play	  with	  multiple	  variables	  changing	  constantly.	  As	  Commander	  in	  Chief,	  the	  President	  of	  the	  United	  States	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  definitive	  decision	  on	  war	  strategy	  and	  is	  required	  to	  make	  decisions	  in	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  American	  security.	  World	  War	  II	  proved	  to	  be	  quite	  complicated	  and	  required	  President	  Franklin	  D.	  Roosevelt	  to	  consider	  many	  options.	  Ultimately,	  Roosevelt	  was	  forced	  to	  choose	  between	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy	  and	  a	  Pacific-­‐first	  strategy	  in	  World	  War	  II.	  He	  chose	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy,	  with	  three	  major	  factors	  heavily	  influencing	  his	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  The	  first	  factor	  was	  public	  opinion.	  The	  American	  people	  needed	  to	  support	  not	  only	  entering	  World	  War	  II,	  but	  also	  the	  government’s	  decision	  on	  which	  Axis	  power	  to	  pursue	  first.	  Second,	  foreign	  representatives	  from	  all	  around	  the	  world	  met	  with	  Roosevelt	  and	  his	  aides	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  persuade	  the	  President	  to	  follow	  their	  advice.	  Finally,	  Roosevelt’s	  military	  advisers	  consulted	  with	  the	  President	  and	  determined	  which	  war	  strategy	  made	  the	  most	  sense	  in	  terms	  of	  manpower,	  tactics,	  supplies,	  and	  firepower.	  Roosevelt	  had	  to	  weigh	  all	  three	  influences	  as	  he	  made	  the	  difficult	  decision	  to	  pursue	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy	  over	  a	  Pacific-­‐first	  strategy	  throughout	  World	  War	  II.	  	   Historians	  differ	  over	  why	  Roosevelt	  chose	  to	  push	  the	  United	  States	  toward	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy	  in	  World	  War	  II.	  Susan	  A.	  Brewer	  believes	  that	  public	  opinion	  in	  the	  United	  States	  demanded	  entry	  into	  the	  war	  against	  Germany.	  In	  her	  book	  Why	  America	  
Fights:	  Patriotism	  and	  War	  Propaganda	  From	  the	  Philippines	  to	  Iraq,	  Brewer	  concentrates	  on	  the	  Office	  of	  War	  Information.	  The	  propaganda	  office	  that	  Roosevelt	  created	  to	  convince	  the	  American	  people	  the	  United	  States	  needed	  to	  fight	  Germany.	  The	  Office	  of	  War	  
	  	   2	  
Information	  “adopted	  the	  ‘strategy	  of	  truth’”1	  and	  presented	  the	  actual	  facts	  on	  Hitler	  and	  the	  German	  military	  campaign	  in	  Europe.	  With	  honest	  information,	  American	  officials	  concluded,	  the	  public	  outcry	  would	  create	  the	  opportunity	  Roosevelt	  needed	  to	  pursue	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy.	  	   	  According	  to	  Warren	  F.	  Kimball,	  foreign	  influences	  pressured	  the	  United	  States	  to	  adopt	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy.	  Kimball	  has	  written	  many	  books	  on	  Roosevelt	  and	  American	  diplomacy	  in	  the	  World	  War	  II	  time	  period.	  In	  his	  book	  Forged	  In	  War:	  Roosevelt,	  Churchill,	  
and	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  ,	  Kimball	  focuses	  on	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  relationship	  and	  the	  events	  that	  led	  up	  to	  the	  United	  States’	  entrance	  into	  the	  war.	  His	  research	  revealed	  that	  Roosevelt	  desired	  to	  build	  relationships	  with	  foreign	  leaders	  and	  “bounced	  ideas	  off	  his	  visitors.”2	  The	  British	  badly	  needed	  both	  American	  entry	  into	  the	  war	  and	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy	  in	  order	  to	  relieve	  German	  pressure	  on	  the	  British	  Isles.	  British	  Prime	  Minister	  Winston	  Churchill	  formed	  a	  close	  personal	  relationship	  with	  Roosevelt	  and	  actively	  pushed	  for	  the	  Americans	  to	  help	  the	  British	  against	  Germany.	  Through	  diplomats	  and	  military	  leaders,	  the	  British	  possessed	  serious	  clout	  in	  the	  Roosevelt	  Administration	  and	  helped	  persuade	  Roosevelt	  to	  utilize	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy.	  	  	   Mark	  A.	  Stoler	  presents	  a	  different	  theory	  in	  his	  book,	  Allies	  and	  Adversaries:	  The	  
Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff,	  the	  Grand	  Alliance,	  and	  U.S.	  Strategy	  in	  World	  War	  II.	  He	  argues	  that	  American	  military	  strategists	  assessed	  the	  military	  capabilities	  of	  Germany	  and	  Japan	  and	  determined	  that	  Germany	  posed	  the	  bigger	  threat	  and	  needed	  to	  be	  dealt	  with	  first.3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Susan	  Brewer,	  Why	  America	  Fights:	  Patriotism	  and	  War	  Propaganda	  From	  the	  Philippines	  2	  Warren	  F.	  Kimball,	  Forged	  In	  War:	  Roosevelt,	  Churchill,	  and	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  (New	  York:	  William	  Morrow	  and	  Company,	  Inc.,	  1997),	  36.	  3	  Mark	  Stoler,	  Allies	  and	  Adversaries:	  The	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff,	  the	  Grand	  Alliance,	  and	  U.S.	  
Strategy	  in	  World	  War	  II	  (Chapel	  Hill,	  NC:	  The	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Press,	  2000),	  16.	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Roosevelt	  respected	  the	  opinions	  of	  his	  military	  advisors	  and	  consulted	  with	  them	  regularly.	  Disagreements	  existed	  amongst	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Army	  and	  United	  States	  Navy,	  but	  a	  majority	  believed	  a	  Europe-­‐	  first	  strategy	  served	  as	  the	  best	  course	  of	  action	  for	  the	  United	  States.	  	   Brewer,	  Kimball	  and	  Stoler	  are	  all	  correct	  in	  their	  individual	  assessments	  of	  why	  Roosevelt	  decided	  to	  enter	  the	  war	  and	  adopt	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy	  over	  a	  Pacific-­‐first	  strategy.	  These	  historians,	  however,	  fail	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  different	  influences	  that	  factored	  into	  Roosevelt’s	  decision.	  Lynne	  Olson	  does	  the	  best	  job	  by	  accounting	  for	  two	  of	  these	  influences	  in	  her	  book	  Those	  Angry	  Days:	  Roosevelt,	  Lindbergh,	  And	  America’s	  Fight	  
Over	  World	  War	  II,	  1939-­‐1941.	  Olson	  acknowledges	  the	  immense	  power	  of	  public	  opinion	  and	  foreign	  influences	  on	  Roosevelt	  prior	  to	  and	  during	  the	  United	  States’	  entry	  into	  World	  War	  II.4	  Olson,	  however,	  fails	  to	  acknowledge	  military	  strategists.	  	  	   In	  this	  paper,	  I	  take	  a	  more	  holistic	  approach	  on	  how	  Roosevelt	  decided	  on	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy	  in	  World	  War	  II.	  Public	  opinion,	  foreign	  influences	  and	  military	  strategists	  are	  the	  three	  main	  factors	  that	  impacted	  Roosevelt’s	  choice.	  These	  factors	  constantly	  played	  off	  of	  one	  another	  and	  often	  became	  intertwined.	  One	  cannot	  gain	  a	  solid	  understanding	  of	  Roosevelt’s	  push	  toward	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy	  without	  first	  comprehending	  the	  complexity	  of	  Roosevelt’s	  multiple	  influences.	  	  	  	  	  	  Public	  Opinion	  	   Public	  opinion	  played	  a	  large	  role	  in	  Roosevelt’s	  decision	  to	  pursue	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy.	  A	  spilt	  along	  ideological	  lines	  emerged	  amongst	  the	  American	  people	  as	  the	  war	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Lynne	  Olson,	  Those	  Angry	  Days:	  Roosevelt,	  Lindbergh,	  And	  America’s	  Fight	  Over	  World	  War	  
II,	  1939-­‐1941	  (New	  York:	  Random	  House,	  2013).	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developed	  in	  Europe	  and	  Asia.	  After	  World	  War	  I,	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  American	  people	  believed	  in	  isolationism.	  President	  Woodrow	  Wilson	  made	  a	  mistake	  by	  leading	  the	  United	  States	  into	  a	  European	  war.	  Americans	  underwent	  major	  sacrifices	  during	  the	  war,	  but	  the	  American	  people	  gained	  very	  little	  with	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Versailles.	  Wilson’s	  Fourteen	  Points	  plan	  failed,	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  making	  the	  world	  safe	  for	  democracy	  was	  lost.	  Isolationists	  refused	  to	  repeat	  the	  mistakes	  of	  the	  past.	  They	  demanded	  neutrality	  and	  expected	  Roosevelt	  to	  keep	  the	  United	  States	  out	  of	  foreign	  conflicts.	  	  A	  small	  group	  of	  interventionists	  (also	  known	  as	  internationalists)	  believed	  the	  United	  States	  needed	  to	  continue	  getting	  involved	  in	  foreign	  affairs	  as	  a	  global	  power.	  The	  Atlantic	  and	  Pacific	  Oceans	  could	  only	  protect	  the	  United	  States	  for	  so	  long.	  Eventually,	  World	  War	  II	  would	  come	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  Internationalists	  realized	  the	  United	  States	  needed	  to	  stop	  Hitler	  in	  Europe	  before	  he	  could	  bring	  the	  fight	  to	  the	  Americas.	  A	  Nazi-­‐controlled	  Europe	  might	  prove	  too	  much	  for	  the	  United	  States	  to	  handle	  alone.	  They	  adopted	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  strong	  defense	  was	  a	  good	  offense.	  Stop	  their	  enemies	  now,	  before	  they	  caused	  a	  bigger	  problem	  later.	  Roosevelt	  recognized	  that	  he	  needed	  to	  generate	  public	  support	  for	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy	  in	  World	  War	  II	  and	  aligned	  himself	  with	  the	  interventionists.	  Along	  with	  the	  interventionists,	  Roosevelt	  knew	  he	  had	  to	  persuade	  the	  isolationist	  majority	  to	  adopt	  interventionism.	  By	  1939,	  a	  major	  portion	  of	  the	  American	  population	  already	  viewed	  Germany	  as	  a	  threat,	  but	  Roosevelt	  used	  the	  media	  to	  help	  convince	  the	  American	  public	  that	  a	  Nazi-­‐controlled	  Europe	  served	  as	  the	  biggest	  threat	  to	  American	  interests.	  Gradually,	  the	  American	  people	  believed	  that	  the	  United	  States	  needed	  to	  take	  military	  action	  against	  Germany	  first	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  the	  fall	  of	  all	  of	  Europe	  to	  Germany.	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Public	  opinion	  in	  the	  United	  States	  over	  World	  War	  II	  radically	  changed	  between	  the	  years	  1939	  to	  1943.	  Early	  in	  this	  period,	  Isolationists	  held	  a	  clear	  lead	  over	  interventionists.	  Memories	  of	  the	  horrors	  of	  World	  War	  I	  haunted	  people’s	  minds.	  “The	  failed	  peace	  and	  economic	  hard	  times	  of	  the	  1930s”5	  pushed	  the	  American	  people	  to	  view	  their	  involvement	  in	  World	  War	  I	  as	  a	  failure.	  In	  fact,	  a	  1939	  poll	  conducted	  by	  the	  American	  Institute	  of	  Public	  Opinion	  found	  that	  59%	  of	  Americans	  felt	  that	  the	  United	  States	  made	  a	  mistake	  entering	  World	  War	  I.6The	  belief	  was	  widespread	  that	  the	  United	  States	  existed	  on	  a	  continent	  “in	  the	  absence	  of	  threats	  from	  abroad.”7	  Isolationism	  dominated	  public	  opinion.	  Congress	  listened	  to	  the	  voices	  of	  constituents	  and	  passed	  a	  series	  of	  Neutrality	  Acts	  from	  1935	  to	  1939	  designed	  to	  “keep	  the	  United	  States	  out	  of	  another	  European	  war.”8	  Roosevelt	  requested	  that	  the	  members	  of	  Congress	  repeal	  the	  Neutrality	  Acts	  in	  1939	  because	  they	  were	  “most	  vitally	  dangerous	  to	  American	  neutrality,	  American	  security,	  and	  American	  peace.”9	  Congress,	  however,	  listened	  to	  the	  American	  public	  and	  denied	  Roosevelt’s	  address	  by	  keeping	  the	  Neutrality	  Acts	  in	  tact.	  Americans	  believed	  that	  the	  United	  States	  needed	  to	  concentrate	  on	  the	  United	  States	  and	  not	  the	  issues	  plaguing	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world.	  As	  the	  war	  in	  Europe,	  Africa	  and	  Asia	  continued,	  however,	  the	  power	  dynamic	  between	  isolationists	  and	  interventionists	  began	  to	  change.	  Events	  such	  as	  Adolf	  Hitler’s	  rapid	  conquest	  of	  Belgium	  and	  France	  and	  German	  U-­‐boats	  challenging	  American	  merchant	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Brewer,	  Why	  America	  Fights,	  90.	  6	  Hadley	  Cantril	  and	  Mildred	  Strunk,	  Public	  Opinion:	  1935-­‐1946	  (Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1951),	  201.	  7	  David	  M.	  Kennedy,	  Freedom	  From	  Fear:	  The	  American	  People	  in	  Depression	  and	  War,	  1929	  
–	  1945	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1999),	  386.	  8	  Brewer,	  Why	  America	  Fights,	  90.	  9	  United	  States	  Department	  of	  State,	  Peace	  and	  War:	  United	  States	  Foreign	  Policy,	  1931-­‐1941	  (Washington	  D.C.:	  United	  States	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  1942),	  68.	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ships	  in	  the	  Atlantic	  caused	  Americans	  to	  view	  Germany	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  An	  increasing	  number	  of	  “internationalists	  began	  to	  advocate	  direct	  United	  States	  intervention.10	  The	  Japanese	  surprise	  attack	  on	  the	  U.S.	  Pacific	  Fleet	  at	  Pearl	  Harbor	  definitively	  galvanized	  the	  American	  people	  into	  action.	  Isolationism	  essentially	  ended	  and	  interventionalism	  dominated	  public	  opinion.	  The	  question	  for	  the	  American	  public	  then	  changed	  from	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  go	  to	  war	  to	  whom	  should	  the	  United	  States	  defeat	  first.	  	  	   First,	  one	  must	  understand	  which	  Axis	  power	  the	  American	  public	  viewed	  as	  the	  greatest	  threat	  to	  American	  security.	  Prior	  to	  Pearl	  Harbor,	  the	  general	  public	  believed	  Germany	  to	  be	  a	  more	  immediate	  threat	  than	  Japan.	  In	  1939,	  an	  American	  Institute	  of	  Public	  Opinion	  poll	  revealed	  that	  41%	  of	  Americans	  thought	  that	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Germany	  would	  go	  to	  war	  sometime	  in	  the	  next	  twenty-­‐five	  years.11	  That	  number	  dropped	  to	  25%	  when	  the	  same	  poll	  asked	  about	  war	  with	  Japan.12	  Americans	  cared	  more	  about	  European	  affairs	  than	  the	  expanding	  power	  of	  the	  Japanese	  empire.	  Before	  the	  Japanese	  attack	  on	  Pearl	  Harbor,	  no	  Asian	  power	  militarily	  challenged	  the	  territorial	  integrity	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  Many	  Americans	  believed	  the	  Japanese	  military	  lacked	  the	  “initiative	  or	  know-­‐how	  to	  launch”13	  an	  attack	  on	  United	  States	  territory.	  The	  Pacific	  Ocean	  stood	  as	  a	  great	  barrier	  between	  Japanese	  expansion	  and	  the	  continental	  United	  States.	  Japan	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  Asia	  sat	  “at	  the	  edges”14	  of	  Americans	  concerns.	  	  American	  history	  possesses	  few	  examples	  of	  European	  powers	  directly	  attacking	  United	  States	  territory,	  and	  Germany	  appeared	  aggressive	  enough	  to	  eventually	  strike	  at	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Brewer,	  Why	  America	  Fights,	  92.	  11	  Cantril	  and	  Strunk,	  Public	  Opinion,	  774.	  12	  Ibid,	  774.	  13	  Brewer,	  Why	  America	  Fights,	  96.	  14	  Waldo	  Heinrichs,	  Threshold	  of	  War:	  Franklin	  D.	  Roosevelt	  &	  American	  Entry	  into	  World	  
War	  II	  (New	  York,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1988),	  36.	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the	  United	  States.	  To	  the	  American	  public,	  a	  strong	  Germany	  seemed	  more	  likely	  to	  challenge	  and	  provoke	  the	  United	  States	  than	  a	  strong	  Japan.	  Crossing	  the	  Atlantic	  Ocean	  was	  far	  easier	  than	  crossing	  the	  Pacific	  Ocean.	  The	  general	  public	  believed	  that	  if	  the	  United	  States	  became	  involved	  in	  the	  war,	  it	  would	  be	  against	  Germany	  first.	  	  Not	  only	  did	  the	  American	  people	  believe	  Nazi	  Germany	  was	  a	  more	  immediate	  threat	  than	  Japan,	  but	  they	  also	  believed	  Germany	  was	  militarily	  and	  industrially	  stronger	  than	  Japan.	  A	  German-­‐controlled	  Europe	  scared	  people	  more	  than	  a	  Japanese-­‐	  controlled	  Asia	  because	  of	  the	  natural,	  industrial,	  and	  military	  resources	  Hitler	  would	  have	  access	  to	  after	  conquering	  other	  European	  countries.	  A	  1940	  poll	  in	  Fortune	  promoted	  this	  idea:	  	  a	  surprising	  61.2%	  of	  Americans	  believed	  Germany	  to	  be	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  United	  States	  if	  it	  defeated	  France	  and	  England.15	  Britain	  maintained	  one	  of	  the	  most	  powerful	  navies	  in	  the	  world.	  France	  maintained	  a	  powerful	  navy	  as	  well	  and	  owned	  valuable	  ports	  with	  access	  to	  the	  Atlantic	  Ocean	  and	  Mediterranean	  Sea.	  Smaller	  countries	  like	  Czechoslovakia	  contained	  large	  amounts	  of	  money	  that	  Hitler	  needed	  to	  fund	  his	  German	  war	  machine.	  The	  countries	  surrounding	  Germany	  possessed	  everything	  the	  Nazis	  needed	  for	  global	  domination.	  Europe	  certainly	  sat	  “at	  the	  center	  of	  Americans’	  world	  concerns.”16	  Americans	  realized	  that	  the	  United	  States	  could	  not	  hope	  to	  defeat	  Germany	  if	  the	  Nazis	  controlled	  all	  the	  wealth	  and	  resources	  of	  Europe.	  	   Newspaper	  editorials	  supported	  this	  theory	  as	  well.	  An	  anonymous	  letter	  to	  the	  editor	  in	  The	  New	  York	  Times	  explained	  that	  once	  Hitler	  and	  Germany	  conquered	  all	  the	  nations	  of	  Europe,	  he	  would	  not	  only	  take	  control	  of	  the	  massive	  and	  powerful	  British	  fleet,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Cantril	  and	  Strunk,	  Public	  Opinion,	  774.	  16	  Heinrichs.	  Threshold	  of	  War,	  36.	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but	  own	  “shipbuilding	  facilities...in	  Germany,	  Norway,	  Belgium,	  Britain	  and	  Holland.”17	  Nazi	  Germany	  could	  then	  easily	  produce	  the	  largest	  and	  most	  powerful	  navy	  in	  the	  world.	  Another	  anonymous	  editorial	  followed	  a	  similar	  argument	  and	  stated	  that	  the	  United	  States	  could	  not	  wait	  for	  Germany	  to	  turn	  British	  resources	  against	  Americans	  such	  as	  “Polish,	  Dutch,	  Belgian	  and	  French	  resources	  are	  being	  turned	  against	  the	  British.”18	  Europe	  possessed	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  most	  prosperous	  and	  affluent	  nations	  in	  the	  world	  with	  powerful	  militaries	  and	  access	  to	  important	  natural	  resources,	  major	  industries	  and	  large	  amounts	  of	  money.	  All	  of	  that	  power	  under	  the	  control	  of	  the	  Nazis	  was	  cause	  for	  concern.	  	   Hitler	  served	  as	  another	  reason	  Americans	  feared	  Germany	  more	  than	  Japan.	  People	  believed	  Hitler	  and	  his	  Nazis	  wanted	  complete	  control	  over	  the	  entire	  world.	  Two	  Fortune	  polls	  in	  April	  of	  1941	  prove	  this.	  The	  first	  poll	  found	  that	  69.3%	  of	  Americans	  agreed	  that	  Hitler	  wanted	  to	  dominate	  the	  United	  States.19	  The	  second	  poll	  revealed	  that	  68.3%	  of	  the	  American	  public	  thought	  Hitler	  would	  never	  be	  satisfied	  until	  he	  dominated	  the	  United	  States	  because	  of	  its	  wealth.20	  These	  polls	  show	  that	  the	  general	  public	  viewed	  Hitler’s	  ambition	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  security	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  Americans	  knew	  that	  Hitler	  transformed	  Germany	  from	  a	  weak	  and	  starving	  country	  back	  into	  a	  military	  and	  economic	  powerhouse.	  The	  American	  people	  also	  witnessed	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  German	  war	  machine	  as	  it	  rolled	  through	  Poland,	  Belgium,	  France	  and	  Demark.	  Hitler	  was	  a	  strong	  and	  capable	  military	  leader	  who	  imperiled	  the	  safety	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  	   Personal	  sentiments	  in	  newspapers	  across	  the	  country	  also	  display	  the	  various	  fears	  of	  the	  American	  public	  prior	  to	  Pearl	  Harbor.	  Some	  people	  did	  believe	  Japan	  to	  be	  a	  serious	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  "To	  Defend	  America,"	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  June	  07,	  1940.	  	  18	  "The	  Choice	  Before	  Us,"	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  June,	  07,	  1941. 	  19	  Cantril	  and	  Strunk,	  Public	  Opinion,	  776.	  20	  Ibid,	  776.	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threat	  and	  that	  the	  United	  States	  needed	  to	  take	  action.	  In	  1939,	  an	  article	  by	  Henry	  Douglas	  in	  The	  Washington	  Post	  stated	  that	  the	  United	  States	  needed	  to	  stop	  supplying	  Japan	  with	  the	  necessary	  resources	  to	  wage	  war.	  He	  explained	  that	  the	  Axis	  alliance	  was	  “a	  tripod”	  and	  that	  the	  United	  States	  must	  stop	  “helping	  Japan	  hold	  up	  her	  leg.”21	  A	  1940	  letter	  to	  the	  editor	  by	  “Ex-­‐Soldier”	  in	  The	  Washington	  Post	  insisted	  that	  “Japan’s	  military	  clique	  is	  quite	  as	  ambitious...as	  Hitler	  ever	  thought	  of	  being”	  and	  that	  the	  “attempt	  to	  ‘appease’	  Japan	  is	  as	  futile	  as	  would	  be	  an	  attempt	  to	  reason	  with	  an	  octopus.”22	  Korean	  American	  Seek	  Hun	  Kimm	  submitted	  an	  editorial	  in	  1941	  that	  suggested	  the	  United	  States	  “fight	  Japan	  at	  once”	  or	  else	  there	  would	  “hardly	  be	  any	  hope	  for	  victory	  for	  America.”23	  There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  American	  people	  knew	  of	  Japan’s	  growing	  power.	  Less	  and	  less	  space	  separated	  the	  expanding	  territory	  of	  the	  Imperial	  Empire	  of	  Japan	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  	   Most	  people,	  however,	  considered	  Germany	  a	  more	  dire	  threat	  to	  the	  security	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  An	  anonymous	  1940	  letter	  to	  the	  editor	  in	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  called	  the	  German	  military	  the	  “most	  mechanized	  army	  the	  world	  has	  ever	  seen.”24	  James	  Lincoln,	  president	  of	  the	  Lincoln	  Electric	  Company,	  agreed	  with	  the	  previous	  editorial	  and	  explained	  that	  if	  the	  United	  States	  took	  “an	  army	  to	  Europe	  it	  would	  be	  chewed	  to	  pieces	  by	  the	  present	  mechanized	  units	  of	  the	  German	  army.”25	  Another	  editorial	  in	  1941	  adamantly	  declared	  that	  the	  United	  States	  was	  “going	  to	  get	  war”26	  with	  Hitler	  and	  Nazi	  Germany,	  especially	  if	  Britain	  fell	  to	  German	  forces.	  Many	  Americans	  believed	  Britain	  was	  the	  last	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Henry	  Douglas,	  "An	  Embargo	  Against	  Japan,"	  The	  Washington	  Post,	  May	  09,	  1939. 	  22	  Ex-­‐Soldier,	  "Letters	  to	  the	  Editor:	  More	  on	  Japan,"	  The	  Washington	  Post,	  June	  14,	  1940.	  	  23	  Seek	  Hun	  Kimm,	  "Letters	  to	  the	  Editor:	  Would	  Fight	  Japan	  Now,"	  The	  Washington	  Post,	  May	  24,	  1941.	  	  24	  "To	  Defend	  America,"	  The	  New	  York	  Times.	  25	  James	  F.	  Lincoln,	  "Voice	  of	  the	  People:	  How	  to	  Build	  an	  Army,"	  The	  Chicago	  Daily	  Tribune,	  May	  29,	  1940.	  	  26	  “The	  Choice	  Before	  Us,”	  The	  New	  York	  Times.	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obstacle	  standing	  between	  Hitler	  and	  his	  global	  aspirations.	  With	  Britain	  ready	  to	  fall,	  war	  with	  Germany	  appeared	  unavoidable.	  	  The	  fear	  of	  a	  Nazi-­‐controlled	  Europe	  moved	  the	  American	  people	  to	  want	  to	  prevent	  Britain	  from	  falling	  to	  Germany.	  Keeping	  Britain	  in	  the	  fight	  as	  long	  as	  possible	  would	  stay	  the	  rising	  power	  of	  Hitler	  in	  Europe.	  By	  1941,	  Germany	  had	  conquered	  France,	  Denmark	  and	  Belgium.	  Americans	  could	  not	  believe	  the	  swift	  German	  conquest	  of	  France.	  If	  the	  United	  States	  needed	  to	  join	  the	  war	  against	  the	  Axis	  powers,	  few	  nations	  remained	  to	  serve	  as	  American	  allies.	  Americans	  viewed	  the	  British	  as	  the	  last	  hope	  for	  Europe,	  and	  many	  Americans	  became	  “convinced	  that…a	  danger	  did	  exist”	  from	  a	  “looming	  Nazi	  threat.”27	  Two	  Gallop	  polls	  from	  August	  1941	  show	  America’s	  support	  for	  the	  British.	  Over	  70%	  of	  Americans	  responded	  that	  they	  supported	  the	  British	  over	  the	  Germans.	  28	  Few	  people	  “doubted	  America’s	  pressing	  need	  for	  allies.”29Americans	  realized	  that	  Germany	  needed	  to	  be	  stopped	  before	  it	  conquered	  Great	  Britain	  or	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Based	  on	  the	  facts	  and	  words	  of	  average	  American	  citizens,	  it	  is	  obvious	  that	  the	  general	  public	  viewed	  Germany,	  Hitler	  and	  the	  Nazis	  as	  greater	  threats	  than	  the	  Japanese	  prior	  to	  Pearl	  Harbor.	  	   After	  the	  Japanese	  attack	  on	  Pearl	  Harbor	  in	  December	  of	  1941,	  an	  increased	  number	  of	  Americans	  believed	  Japan	  to	  be	  a	  greater	  threat.	  This	  is	  demonstrated	  in	  various	  newspaper	  articles	  and	  editorials.	  In	  an	  editorial	  published	  the	  day	  after	  Pearl	  Harbor,	  foreign	  news	  correspondent	  for	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  Anne	  McCormick	  calls	  the	  Japanese	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Lynne	  Olson,	  Those	  Angry	  Days,	  100.	  	  28	  George	  Gallup,	  "The	  Gallup	  Poll:	  Sentiment	  for	  Aid	  to	  Britain	  Not	  Diminished	  by	  Prolonged	  Nazi-­‐Soviet	  War,	  Survey	  Finds,"	  The	  Washington	  Post,	  August	  01,	  1941.	  	  29	  Brewer,	  Why	  America	  Fights,	  97.	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“more	  fanatic	  than	  the	  Nazis”	  with	  a	  “greater	  indifference	  to	  death.”30	  Another	  December	  8,	  1941	  editorial	  in	  The	  Washington	  Post	  claimed	  that	  Japan	  was	  the	  more	  major	  threat	  because	  of	  the	  closer	  proximity	  of	  Japanese	  territory	  to	  territory	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  The	  author	  explained	  that	  with	  a	  Japanese	  defeated	  United	  States,	  “the	  dream	  of	  the	  Japanese	  militarists	  would	  be	  realized.”31	  A	  direct	  Japanese	  attack	  on	  the	  United	  States	  scared	  many	  Americans,	  especially	  those	  who	  lived	  along	  the	  West	  Coast,	  Alaska	  and	  Hawaii.	  The	  Japanese	  already	  showed	  they	  possessed	  the	  capability	  and	  willingness	  to	  attack	  the	  United	  States	  on	  American	  soil.	  Another	  attack	  seemed	  perfectly	  plausible.	  	   	  Even	  after	  Pearl	  Harbor,	  however,	  most	  Americans	  believed	  Germany	  was	  the	  more	  serious	  threat	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  Three	  days	  after	  the	  Japanese	  attacked	  Pearl	  Harbor,	  an	  American	  Institute	  of	  Public	  Opinion	  poll	  showed	  that	  64%	  of	  the	  general	  public	  thought	  that	  Germany	  was	  the	  principal	  enemy	  of	  America	  while	  only	  15%	  chose	  Japan.32	  This	  trend	  continued	  all	  the	  way	  through	  1943	  in	  various	  polls	  conducted	  by	  the	  major	  polling	  organizations,	  including	  the	  American	  Institute	  of	  Public	  Opinion,	  the	  National	  Opinion	  Research	  Center,	  and	  the	  Office	  of	  Public	  Opinion	  Research.	  Fortune	  conducted	  a	  poll	  in	  1942	  that	  reported	  that	  only	  10.2%	  of	  Americans	  believed	  Japan	  to	  be	  a	  greater	  threat	  than	  Germany	  while	  almost	  50%	  of	  the	  public	  viewed	  Germany	  as	  more	  of	  a	  menace.33	  Japan	  attacked	  a	  military	  base	  on	  American	  soil,	  but	  Americans	  recognized	  the	  growing	  military	  and	  industrial	  power	  of	  the	  Nazi	  regime	  in	  Europe	  as	  a	  greater	  threat.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Anne	  O'Hare	  McCormick,	  "For	  Americans	  the	  Question	  Period	  is	  Over,"	  The	  New	  York	  
Times,	  December	  08,	  1941.	  31	  "The	  Hour	  has	  Struck,"	  The	  Washington	  Post,	  December	  08,	  1941.	  	  32	  Cantril	  and	  Strunk,	  Public	  Opinion,	  776.	  33	  Ibid,	  776.	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   Three	  days	  after	  the	  surprise	  attack,	  Hitler	  declared	  war	  against	  the	  United	  States.	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  American	  public	  feared	  Nazi	  Germany	  more	  and	  quickly	  voiced	  their	  opinions	  in	  newspapers	  across	  the	  country.	  Veronique	  Hall	  blamed	  Pearl	  Harbor	  on	  the	  Germans	  in	  her	  letter	  to	  the	  editor	  and	  accused	  the	  Nazis	  of	  plotting	  the	  attack.	  She	  also	  called	  Nazi	  Germany	  the	  United	  States	  “major	  enemy.”34	  The	  New	  York	  Times	  warned	  that	  if	  Hitler	  wins	  in	  Europe,	  then	  Americans	  shall	  be	  in	  deadly	  danger,	  even	  if	  they	  crushed	  Japan.”35	  A	  letter	  to	  the	  editor	  in	  The	  Washington	  Post	  about	  the	  current	  war	  only	  mentions	  Germany	  as	  a	  threat	  and	  how	  the	  United	  States	  needs	  to	  “obtain	  maximum	  efficiency	  in	  our	  war	  industries.”36	  Many	  Americans	  recognized	  Germany	  as	  the	  leader	  and	  the	  most	  powerful	  of	  the	  Axis	  powers.	  Roosevelt	  employed	  a	  multitude	  of	  tactics	  to	  muster	  public	  support	  for	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  war	  strategy,	  but	  his	  most	  influential	  tactics	  involved	  the	  media.	  Newspapers,	  magazines	  and	  movies	  dominated	  American	  culture	  and	  possessed	  major	  powers	  of	  persuasion	  with	  the	  public.	  Roosevelt	  realized	  the	  full	  persuasive	  potential	  of	  the	  media	  and	  used	  the	  media	  to	  convince	  the	  general	  public	  to	  accept	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  war	  strategy.37	  Roosevelt	  knew	  that	  a	  majority	  of	  Americans	  viewed	  Germany	  as	  a	  threat,	  and	  he	  used	  that	  understanding	  to	  gather	  more	  support	  for	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy	  through	  the	  media.	  	  Fortunately	  for	  Roosevelt,	  groups	  of	  interventionists	  such	  as	  the	  Century	  Group	  began	  to	  organize	  and	  influence	  public	  opinion	  towards	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy.	  The	  Century	  Group	  served	  as	  one	  of	  the	  first	  groups	  to	  support	  American	  intervention	  in	  World	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Veronique	  Hall,	  "Letters	  to	  the	  Editor:	  Nazi	  War	  Strategy,"	  The	  Washington	  Post,	  December	  10,	  1941.	  35	  "War	  with	  Japan,"	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  December	  08,	  1941.	  	  36	  "Way	  to	  Victory,"	  The	  Washington	  Post,	  December	  22,	  1941.	  	  37	  Michael	  G.	  Carew,	  The	  Power	  to	  Persuade:	  FDR,	  the	  Newsmagazines,	  and	  Going	  to	  War,	  
1939-­‐1941	  (Lanham,	  MD:	  University	  Press	  of	  America,	  2005),	  1.	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War	  II	  publically.	  As	  early	  as	  1940,	  the	  Century	  Group	  aggressively	  called	  for	  the	  “unspeakable…immediate	  war	  against	  Germany.”38	  Members	  included	  “movers	  and	  shakers	  in	  the	  East	  Coast’s	  top	  journalistic,	  legal,	  financial,	  and	  intellectual	  circles.”39	  Members	  such	  as	  journalist	  Herbert	  Agar	  and	  CBS	  news	  commentator	  Elmer	  Davis	  proved	  especially	  influential	  on	  public	  opinion.	  Century	  Group	  members	  used	  their	  influence	  on	  media	  to	  share	  their	  common	  belief	  that	  “nothing	  short	  of	  active	  U.S.	  belligerency	  would	  save	  Britain	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  Western	  Civilization.”40Many	  of	  the	  Century	  Group’s	  members	  held	  positions	  that	  placed	  them	  in	  the	  public	  eye,	  but	  the	  Century	  Group	  as	  a	  whole	  “worked	  covertly”41	  to	  organize	  and	  spread	  their	  interventionist	  views.	  Though	  small	  in	  terms	  of	  membership,	  the	  Century	  Group	  possessed	  major	  potential	  to	  influence	  the	  general	  public	  through	  the	  vast	  resources	  available	  to	  its	  exclusive	  clientele.	  	  	   The	  first	  media	  Roosevelt	  used	  were	  the	  newsmagazines-­‐-­‐	  Life,	  Look,	  Newsweek	  and	  
Time—which	  “reached	  almost	  half	  of	  the	  adult	  American	  population”	  by	  1939.42	  This	  was	  an	  unprecedented	  readership	  that	  carried	  hefty	  political	  weight	  and	  influence.	  Roosevelt	  needed	  these	  newsmagazines	  to	  support	  him	  and	  his	  push	  for	  war	  in	  Europe.	  Fortunately	  for	  Roosevelt,	  Henry	  Luce,	  member	  of	  the	  Century	  Group	  and	  devoted	  interventionist,	  owned	  Life	  and	  Time.	  Some	  scholars	  describe	  Luce	  as	  “America’s	  single	  most	  powerful	  and	  innovative	  mass	  communicator”43	  during	  the	  World	  War	  II	  time	  period.	  Luce	  held	  significant	  sway	  over	  public	  opinion	  and	  did	  not	  shy	  away	  from	  using	  his	  influence	  to	  share	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Olson,	  Those	  Angry	  Days,	  137.	  39	  Ibid,	  139.	  40	  Ibid,	  146.	  	  41	  Mark	  Lincoln	  Chadwin,	  The	  War	  Hawks	  of	  World	  War	  II	  (Chapel	  Hill:	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Press,	  1968)	  79.	  42	  Carew,	  The	  Power	  to	  Persuade,	  2.	  43	  James	  L.	  Baughman,	  Henry	  R.	  Luce	  and	  the	  Rise	  of	  the	  American	  News	  Media	  (Boston:	  Twayne	  Publishing,	  1987),	  1.	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his	  political	  opinions.	  His	  father	  worked	  in	  China	  as	  a	  missionary	  and	  taught	  his	  son	  to	  view	  the	  United	  States	  as	  a	  “selfless	  Western	  power.”44	  Ultimately,	  this	  view	  of	  the	  United	  States	  led	  Luce	  to	  believe	  that	  America	  alone	  deserved	  to	  be	  the	  world	  leader	  for	  freedom,	  human	  rights	  and	  democracy.	  He	  believed	  that	  as	  a	  world	  power,	  the	  United	  States	  could	  not	  act	  “like	  an	  infinitely	  mightier	  Switzerland.”45	  Luce	  proved	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  interventionists.	  	  	   Luce	  made	  his	  best	  argument	  for	  American	  entry	  into	  the	  European	  front	  when	  he	  published	  his	  article	  “The	  American	  Century”	  on	  February	  17,	  1941	  in	  Life.	  In	  his	  article,	  Luce	  masterfully	  crafts	  a	  logical	  and	  emotional	  argument	  for	  how	  the	  United	  States	  was	  already	  in	  the	  war	  and	  needed	  to	  fully	  commit	  to	  stopping	  Hitler	  in	  Europe.	  He	  frankly	  stated	  that	  Americans	  wanted	  “Hitler	  stopped	  -­‐	  more	  than	  (Americans)	  want(ed)	  to	  stay	  out	  of	  the	  war.”46	  A	  world	  in	  which	  Hitler	  defeats	  Great	  Britain	  and	  controls	  Europe	  was	  a	  world	  in	  which	  the	  United	  States	  could	  not	  hope	  to	  thrive	  or	  possibly	  even	  survive.	  Luce	  explained	  that	  American	  participation	  in	  the	  war	  was	  “needed	  for	  the	  shaping	  of	  the	  future	  of	  America	  and	  of	  the	  world.”47	  The	  world	  desperately	  needed	  American	  ideals	  such	  as	  democracy	  and	  free	  enterprise.	  Wilson	  failed	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  opportunity	  to	  make	  the	  United	  States	  the	  leading	  world	  power	  and	  create	  peace.48	  In	  order	  to	  gain	  leadership	  on	  the	  global	  stage,	  the	  United	  States	  needed	  to	  secure	  an	  American-­‐dominated	  peace	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Ibid,	  11.	  	  45	  Mark	  Lincoln	  Chadwin,	  The	  War	  Hawks:	  American	  Interventionalism	  Before	  Pearl	  Harbor	  (Chapel	  Hill:	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Press,	  1968),	  63.	  46	  Henry	  R.	  Luce,	  "The	  American	  Century,"	  originally	  published	  in	  Life	  (1941),	  republished	  in	  Diplomatic	  History	  (1999)	  23	  (2),	  161.	  	  47	  Ibid,	  166.	  	  48	  Ibid,	  166-­‐167.	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Europe.	  Fully	  committing	  to	  the	  war	  provided	  Roosevelt	  and	  the	  American	  people	  with	  a	  rare	  second	  chance	  to	  fix	  Wilson’s	  mistakes.	  	  Republican	  adversaries	  of	  Roosevelt	  controlled	  and/or	  owned	  the	  other	  two	  popular	  newsmagazines.	  This	  proved	  to	  be	  quite	  an	  obstacle	  for	  the	  Roosevelt	  Administration	  because	  the	  newsmagazines	  constantly	  published	  articles	  against	  the	  policies	  of	  Roosevelt.	  Roosevelt	  fixed	  the	  problem	  in	  1940	  by	  assigning	  people	  in	  his	  administration	  to	  convince	  the	  owners	  of	  Look	  and	  Newsweek	  to	  promote	  “the	  threat	  of	  the	  Nazi-­‐led	  Axis.”49	  Roosevelt	  wanted	  all	  four	  of	  the	  big	  newsmagazines	  to	  support	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy.	  Those	  who	  could	  not	  be	  convinced	  were	  bribed	  with	  high	  positions	  in	  the	  federal	  government	  that	  reported	  only	  to	  Roosevelt.50	  Look	  and	  Newsweek	  publishers	  quickly	  changed	  their	  attitude	  towards	  war	  and	  the	  Roosevelt	  Administration.	  They	  followed	  the	  example	  set	  by	  Henry	  Luce	  and	  increased	  the	  number	  of	  stories	  on	  war-­‐related	  events,	  especially	  in	  Europe.	  	  The	  newsmagazines	  also	  increased	  the	  number	  of	  favorable	  stories	  on	  how	  Roosevelt	  handled	  current	  political	  situations.	  Life,	  Look,	  Newsweek	  and	  Time	  published	  around	  three	  times	  more	  war	  stories	  about	  Germany	  than	  about	  Japan	  between	  1939	  and	  1941.51	  This	  put	  Germany	  in	  the	  forefront	  of	  the	  American	  public’s	  mind.	  American	  hero	  and	  staunch	  isolationist	  Charles	  Lindbergh	  feared	  the	  increasingly	  sensationalist	  newspaper	  stories	  pushing	  for	  American	  involvement	  in	  the	  war,	  but	  he	  feared	  the	  American	  public’s	  willingness	  to	  go	  “along	  with	  the	  plan”52	  even	  more.	  The	  increased	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Carew,	  The	  Power	  to	  Persuade,	  9.	  	  50	  Ibid.	  	  51	  Ibid,	  57-­‐71.	  	  52	  Olson,	  Those	  Angry	  Days,	  102.	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number	  of	  articles	  on	  Nazi	  war	  stories	  helped	  convince	  Americans	  that	  Nazi	  Germany	  was	  a	  greater	  threat	  to	  American	  security	  than	  the	  Japanese	  Empire.	  	  With	  prompting	  from	  the	  Roosevelt	  Administration,	  reporters	  joined	  the	  conversation	  over	  the	  threats	  of	  Nazi	  Germany	  and	  the	  Japanese	  Empire.	  Mark	  Sullivan	  of	  
The	  Washington	  Post	  also	  pointed	  out	  that	  Nazi	  Germany	  had	  to	  be	  destroyed	  first	  in	  order	  to	  save	  American	  allies	  which	  would	  eventually	  help	  the	  United	  States	  against	  Japan.	  Sullivan	  used	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  as	  an	  example	  is	  his	  article	  and	  wrote	  that	  the	  Russians	  prioritized	  fighting	  Hitler	  and	  the	  Nazis	  because	  “a	  large	  portion	  of	  Russian’s	  territory	  was	  occupied	  by	  Germany.”53	  Barnet	  Nover	  completely	  agreed	  with	  his	  fellow	  reporter	  and	  insisted	  that	  the	  United	  States	  must	  go	  to	  Europe	  first	  and	  save	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  from	  Germany	  in	  order	  for	  the	  Red	  Army	  to	  join	  “the	  United	  States,	  Great	  Britain	  and	  China...in	  combating	  the	  menace	  that	  confronts	  them	  all.”54	  Reporters	  realized	  that	  the	  United	  States	  required	  allies	  in	  order	  to	  defeat	  the	  fascist	  regimes	  of	  Germany	  and	  Japan.	  In	  order	  to	  have	  allies,	  the	  United	  States	  needed	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  European	  continent	  and	  save	  countries	  from	  the	  wrath	  of	  Hitler’s	  army.	  	  	  In	  1941,	  another	  interventionist	  group	  in	  support	  of	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy	  called	  the	  Fight	  for	  Freedom	  started	  to	  gain	  sway	  with	  the	  American	  public.	  The	  Century	  Group	  disbanded	  in	  1941	  because	  it	  lacked	  “a	  grassroots	  structure	  and	  broad-­‐based	  financial	  support.”55	  Some	  of	  the	  former	  Century	  Group	  members	  collaborated	  in	  the	  founding	  of	  Fight	  For	  Freedom,	  and	  they	  resolved	  to	  be	  more	  direct	  in	  their	  push	  for	  American	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  Mark	  Sullivan,	  "The	  New	  Pact:	  Our	  Objectives	  in	  the	  War,"	  The	  Washington	  Post,	  Janaury	  05,	  1942.	  	  54	  Barnet	  Nover,	  "The	  Die	  is	  Cast:	  War	  Breaks	  Out	  in	  the	  Pacific,"	  The	  Washington	  Post,	  December	  08,	  1941.	  	  55	  Olson,	  Those	  Angry	  Days,	  323.	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intervention	  against	  Nazi	  Germany.	  They	  expanded	  their	  membership	  by	  inviting	  more	  important	  public	  figures	  to	  join	  their	  cause.	  These	  people	  included	  Republican	  politician	  Wendell	  Willkie,	  chairman	  of	  the	  Senate	  Finance	  Committee	  Carter	  Glass	  and	  Bishop	  Henry	  W.	  Hobson.56	  Other	  new	  members	  included	  presidents	  of	  multiple	  universities,	  members	  of	  the	  clergy	  and	  business	  elites.57	  Former	  members	  of	  the	  Century	  Group	  hoped	  that	  the	  inclusion	  of	  more	  public	  figures	  would	  broaden	  their	  appeal	  to	  the	  masses.	  	  Fight	  for	  Freedom	  also	  collaborated	  with	  other	  organizations	  that	  supported	  a	  Germany	  first	  strategy	  such	  as	  Friends	  of	  Democracy.	  Friends	  of	  Democracy	  proved	  	  “more	  militant”58	  and	  published	  scathing	  remarks	  about	  isolationists,	  but	  the	  collaboration	  between	  the	  groups	  proved	  to	  be	  efficient	  and	  effective.	  Instead	  of	  relying	  solely	  on	  national	  media,	  Fight	  For	  Freedom	  members	  decided	  to	  work	  locally	  and	  build	  a	  national	  movement	  from	  the	  ground	  up.	  Fight	  for	  Freedom	  members	  organized	  “an	  extensive	  network	  of	  chapters	  throughout	  the	  country”	  and	  these	  chapters	  “recruited	  local	  newspapers…and	  sponsored	  rallies	  and	  letter	  writing	  campaigns	  to	  Congress.”59	  Chapters	  opened	  in	  around	  “sixty-­‐five	  major	  cities,	  mostly	  in	  the	  regions	  along	  the	  Atlantic,	  Pacific	  and	  Gulf	  coasts,”60	  but	  chapters	  existed	  in	  the	  Midwest	  and	  Rocky	  Mountains	  regions	  as	  well.	  They	  gained	  a	  wider	  public	  audience	  than	  the	  Century	  Group	  and	  played	  a	  pivotal	  role	  in	  building	  public	  support	  for	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy.	  	  The	  Roosevelt	  Administration	  used	  posters	  as	  another	  strategy	  to	  create	  public	  support	  for	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy.	  Roosevelt	  established	  the	  Office	  of	  War	  Information	  in	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  Chadwin,	  The	  Hawks	  of	  World	  War	  II,	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  57	  Ibid,	  168.	  58	  Olson,	  Those	  Angry	  Days,	  324.	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  Ibid,	  324.	  60	  Chadwin,	  The	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  of	  World	  War	  II,	  171.	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1942	  to	  promote	  ongoing	  support	  for	  the	  war	  and	  explain	  to	  the	  American	  people	  why	  the	  United	  States	  needed	  to	  fight	  the	  Nazis.61	  The	  Office	  of	  War	  Information	  published	  many	  posters	  throughout	  the	  United	  States	  and	  placed	  them	  in	  high	  visibility	  areas	  to	  keep	  the	  war	  in	  the	  public’s	  mind.	  A	  majority	  of	  these	  posters	  focused	  on	  mobilizing	  the	  domestic	  population	  for	  supporting	  war	  efforts	  and	  fostering	  “public	  support	  for	  U.S.	  aid	  to	  nations	  resisting	  Nazi	  aggression.”62	  Many	  of	  these	  posters	  contained	  imagery	  designed	  to	  explain	  why	  the	  United	  States	  chose	  to	  follow	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Figure	  163	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  Figure	  264	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  Brewer,	  Why	  America	  Fights,	  88.	  62	  Ibid,	  90.	  63	  Fig.	  1.	  Lawrence	  Beall	  Smith,	  Don’t	  Let	  that	  Shadow	  Touch	  Them:	  Buy	  War	  Bonds.	  Poster,	  World	  War	  II	  Poster	  Collection	  at	  Northwestern	  University	  Library,	  Evanston,	  Illinois,	  www.library.northwestern.edu/libraries-­‐collections/evanston-­‐campus/government-­‐information/world-­‐war-­‐ii-­‐poster-­‐collection.	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Figure	  1	  and	  Figure	  2	  are	  propaganda	  posters	  designed	  to	  portray	  Nazi	  Germany	  as	  a	  direct	  threat	  to	  the	  American	  way	  of	  life.	  Americans	  were	  “in	  imminent	  danger”65	  from	  Hitler,	  and	  Americans	  needed	  to	  act	  soon.	  Figure	  1	  depicts	  young	  American	  children	  almost	  being	  touched	  by	  the	  shadow	  of	  a	  Nazi	  swastika.	  The	  United	  States	  government	  conducted	  a	  study	  on	  commercial	  posters	  and	  “found	  that	  images	  of…children	  in	  danger	  were	  effective	  emotional	  devices.”66	  The	  children	  are	  playing	  with	  symbols	  of	  American	  pride	  such	  as	  the	  Stars	  and	  Stripes	  and	  the	  American	  airplane.	  They	  have	  no	  means	  to	  protect	  themselves	  from	  the	  swastika	  and	  the	  American	  people	  needed	  to	  step	  in	  and	  help	  before	  it	  was	  too	  late.	  The	  innocence	  and	  purity	  of	  America’s	  youth	  and	  future	  were	  in	  danger.	  	   Figure	  2	  shows	  a	  swastika	  branded	  boot	  smashing	  the	  steeple	  of	  an	  American	  church.	  The	  church	  was	  a	  central	  part	  of	  many	  American’s	  lives	  and	  serves	  as	  a	  powerful	  symbol	  for	  Nazi	  oppression.	  If	  the	  American	  people	  continued	  to	  allow	  Nazi	  aggression	  to	  go	  unchecked,	  the	  Nazis	  would	  bring	  the	  fight	  to	  the	  American	  continents.	  If	  the	  Nazis	  conquered	  Europe	  and	  moved	  on	  to	  the	  United	  States	  nothing	  would	  be	  safe,	  including	  religion.	  The	  United	  States	  entered	  the	  war	  to	  protect	  the	  American	  way	  of	  life.	  The	  Nazis	  would	  stamp	  out	  the	  basic	  rights	  Americans	  held	  dear	  such	  as	  freedom	  of	  religion.	  The	  poster	  played	  “on	  the	  public's	  fear	  of	  the	  enemy”67	  and	  the	  consequences	  of	  not	  stopping	  Hitler	  in	  Europe.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  Fig.	  2.	  C.	  R.	  Miller,	  We’re	  Fighting	  to	  Prevent	  This,	  Poster,	  Powers	  of	  Persuasion	  at	  The	  National	  Archives,	  www.archives.gov/exhibits/powers_of_persuasion/warning/	  warning.html	  65	  "Powers	  of	  Persuasion,"	  National	  Archives	  and	  Records	  Administration.	  www.archives.gov/exhibits/powers_of_persuasion/warning/warning.html	  66	  Ibid.	  67	  Ibid	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  Figure	  368	  Glenn	  Grohe’s	  poster	  in	  Figure	  3	  represents	  another	  fear	  held	  by	  the	  American	  public.	  The	  poster	  depicts	  a	  partially	  hidden	  German	  soldier	  with	  piercing	  eyes	  “watching”	  American	  citizens.	  This	  means	  that	  Hitler	  and	  the	  German	  Army	  already	  had	  their	  eyes	  set	  on	  infiltrating	  the	  United	  States	  and	  taking	  the	  war	  into	  the	  Western	  Hemisphere.	  German	  spies	  could	  be	  anywhere,	  gathering	  intelligence	  on	  American	  industry	  and	  military	  might.	  The	  intent	  was	  to	  create	  a	  sense	  of	  paranoia	  among	  the	  American	  public	  and	  explain	  why	  Americans	  needed	  to	  support	  immediate	  action	  against	  Germany,	  not	  Japan.	  	  	   	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  Fig.	  3.	  Glenn	  Ernest	  Grohe,	  He’s	  Watching	  You,	  Poster,	  World	  War	  II	  Poster	  Collection	  at	  Northwestern	  University	  Library,	  Evanston,	  Illinois,	  www.library.northwestern.edu/libraries-­‐collections/evanston-­‐campus/government-­‐information/world-­‐war-­‐ii-­‐poster-­‐collection.	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  Figure	  469	  Americans	  also	  hated	  the	  brutality	  of	  the	  Nazis.	  Posters	  such	  as	  Figure	  4	  informed	  the	  general	  public	  of	  the	  horrifying	  deeds	  perpetrated	  by	  Hitler	  and	  his	  SS	  units	  against	  the	  people	  they	  conquered.	  Nazis	  committed	  crimes	  against	  humanity	  in	  a	  way	  that	  Americans	  viewed	  as	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  evil.	  Another	  hidden	  message	  is	  contained	  in	  the	  poster.	  Implied	  in	  this	  image	  is	  the	  “idea	  that	  what	  happened	  there	  could	  happen	  here.”70	  Americans	  needed	  to	  prevent	  the	  evils	  of	  Nazi	  Germany	  coming	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  The	  men	  and	  women	  of	  the	  United	  States	  possessed	  a	  duty	  not	  only	  to	  protect	  themselves,	  but	  also	  those	  oppressed	  by	  the	  Nazi	  regime.	  	  Hollywood	  eventually	  joined	  other	  media	  outlets	  in	  promoting	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy	  to	  the	  American	  public.	  Before	  Hollywood	  started	  releasing	  movies	  in	  support	  of	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  Ben	  Shahn,	  This	  is	  Nazi	  Brutality,	  Poster,	  Powers	  of	  Persuasion	  at	  The	  National	  Archives,	  www.archives.gov/exhibits/powers_of_persuasion/warning/	  warning.html.	  70	  “Powers	  of	  Persuasion,"	  National	  Archives	  and	  Records	  Administration,	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Europe-­‐first	  strategy,	  newsreels	  shown	  before	  movies	  displayed	  feature	  stories	  on	  Hitler	  and	  his	  Nazi	  regime.	  These	  stories	  shared	  with	  the	  American	  public	  the	  threat	  Germany	  “posed	  to	  peace.”71	  Henry	  Luce	  again	  played	  an	  important	  role	  with	  his	  newsreel	  service	  
March	  of	  Time.	  March	  of	  Time	  produced	  a	  newsreel	  titled	  “Inside	  Nazi	  Germany,”	  which	  depicted	  German	  brutality	  toward	  Jewish	  people	  such	  as	  German	  “police	  rounding	  up	  Jews.”72	  These	  newsreels	  aired	  in	  movie	  theaters	  across	  the	  country	  and	  informed	  millions	  of	  Americans	  about	  Nazi	  brutality.	  	  Along	  with	  newsreels,	  many	  films	  depicted	  the	  evil	  actions	  of	  Nazi	  Germany.	  Films	  such	  as	  Confessions	  of	  a	  Nazi	  Spy,	  Foreign	  Correspondent	  and	  Sergeant	  York	  showed	  Hollywood’s	  producer’s	  “interventionist	  leanings.”73	  	  Many	  movie	  producers,	  directors	  and	  actors	  were	  either	  involved	  in	  the	  Century	  Group	  or	  Fight	  for	  Freedom,	  including	  the	  Academy	  of	  Motion	  Picture	  Arts	  and	  Sciences	  President	  Walter	  Wanger	  and	  famous	  actor	  Humphrey	  Bogart.74	  Film	  proved	  especially	  powerful	  for	  explaining	  why	  Americans	  should	  support	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy.	  Moviegoers	  actually	  saw	  clips	  of	  the	  war	  in	  Europe	  and	  the	  power	  of	  the	  Nazi	  military.	  These	  films	  put	  powerful	  images	  of	  German	  cruelty	  and	  military	  might	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  millions	  of	  Americans.	  	  	   Another	  medium	  Roosevelt	  explored	  in	  his	  quest	  to	  win	  over	  the	  American	  public	  was	  radio.	  Famous	  for	  his	  ’fireside	  chats,”	  Roosevelt	  “mastered	  the	  use	  of	  radio	  to	  reach”	  the	  American	  people.75	  He	  talked	  directly	  to	  American	  listeners	  and	  explained	  his	  opinions	  and	  actions	  on	  current	  events	  such	  as	  the	  growing	  war	  in	  Europe.	  In	  his	  September	  3,	  1939	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  Olson,	  Those	  Angry	  Days,	  364.	  72	  Ibid,	  364.	  73	  Brewer,	  Why	  America	  Fights,	  92.	  74	  Olson,	  Those	  Angry	  Days,	  361.	  	  75	  Brewer,	  Why	  America	  Fights,	  102.	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radio	  address	  to	  the	  people,	  Roosevelt	  cautioned	  Americans	  to	  “realize	  that	  every	  word	  that	  comes	  through	  the	  air,	  every	  ship	  that	  sails	  the	  sea,	  every	  battle	  that	  is	  fought	  does	  affect	  the	  American	  future.”76	  He	  mentioned	  this	  in	  order	  to	  show	  the	  isolationists	  that	  neutrality	  did	  not	  equal	  an	  escape	  from	  the	  problems	  and	  issues	  in	  Europe.	  	  In	  his	  December	  29,	  1940	  fireside	  chat,	  Roosevelt	  explained	  to	  the	  nation	  the	  growing	  threats	  of	  Nazi	  Germany.	  He	  stated	  that	  there	  was	  “danger	  ahead—danger	  against	  which	  we	  must	  prepare.”77	  After	  the	  hostile	  exchange	  between	  a	  German	  U-­‐boat	  and	  the	  U.S.	  Destroyer	  Greer	  in	  September	  of	  1941,	  Roosevelt	  informed	  the	  public	  of	  the	  Nazi	  threat	  to	  American	  trade	  and	  safety.78	  He	  wished	  to	  ready	  the	  American	  people	  for	  the	  inevitable	  conflict	  with	  the	  Axis	  powers	  and	  the	  growing	  threat	  to	  American	  interests	  in	  the	  Western	  Hemisphere.	  Hopefully,	  the	  reality	  of	  German	  aggression	  in	  the	  Atlantic	  Ocean	  would	  gather	  support	  for	  his	  ideas	  behind	  his	  rearmament	  programs.	  Roosevelt	  needed	  the	  general	  public	  to	  realize	  the	  dire	  gravity	  of	  the	  situation.	  	   	  Two	  days	  after	  Pearl	  Harbor	  Roosevelt	  addressed	  the	  nation	  on	  the	  radio	  and	  declared	  that	  the	  United	  States	  was	  “now	  in	  this	  war.”79	  Congress	  had	  approved	  Roosevelt’s	  plea	  to	  declare	  “a	  state	  of	  war...between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  Japanese	  Empire.”80	  The	  United	  States	  could	  no	  longer	  hide	  behind	  a	  shield	  of	  neutrality.	  Not	  only	  did	  Roosevelt	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mention	  Pearl	  Harbor	  and	  the	  Japanese	  aggressors,	  but	  he	  also	  mentioned	  the	  growing	  power	  of	  Hitler	  and	  Nazi	  Germany	  in	  Europe.	  Three	  days	  later,	  Congress	  passed	  Roosevelt’s	  request	  to	  declare	  war	  on	  Germany	  and	  Italy	  because	  they	  represented	  the	  greatest	  “challenge	  to	  life,	  liberty,	  and	  civilization.”81	  Finally,	  Roosevelt	  confirmed	  the	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy	  to	  the	  American	  public	  in	  his	  1943	  fireside	  chat	  on	  his	  visits	  with	  foreign	  leaders	  at	  the	  Teheran	  and	  Cairo	  Conferences.	  He	  explained	  the	  vital	  importance	  of	  “launching	  a	  gigantic	  attack	  upon	  Germany”82	  along	  with	  the	  necessity	  of	  keeping	  Germany’s	  enemies	  such	  as	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  Great	  Britain	  in	  the	  war.	  Through	  various	  media	  outlets,	  Roosevelt	  gradually	  won	  over	  the	  American	  public	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  war	  strategy.	  	  	  	   By	  then,	  public	  opinion	  in	  the	  United	  States	  clearly	  favored	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  war	  strategy.	  In	  1939,	  the	  American	  public	  desired	  to	  stay	  neutral,	  but	  people	  also	  recognized	  the	  expanding	  reach	  of	  foreign	  aggressors	  and	  knew	  that	  the	  United	  States	  needed	  to	  step	  in	  and	  eventually	  fight.	  Hitler	  and	  a	  Nazi-­‐controlled	  Europe	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  greater	  threat	  than	  Japan	  in	  the	  general	  public’s	  eye.	  Roosevelt	  and	  the	  American	  people	  wanted	  Germany	  to	  be	  defeated	  before	  concentrating	  all	  efforts	  on	  the	  Japanese	  threat	  in	  the	  Pacific.	  Even	  after	  a	  surprise	  attack	  on	  the	  United	  States	  at	  Pearl	  Harbor,	  Americans	  still	  feared	  Germany	  more.	  Various	  polls	  from	  multiple	  sources	  and	  personal	  sentiments	  in	  letters	  to	  the	  editors	  all	  over	  the	  United	  States	  display	  this	  fear.	  Hitler	  and	  the	  Nazis	  were	  the	  biggest	  threat	  to	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  Germany	  and	  Italy	  (December	  11,	  1941)."	  	  82	  Franklin	  D.	  Roosevelt,	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American	  security	  in	  the	  public’s	  opinion	  and	  the	  American	  people	  demanded	  a	  Germany	  first	  strategy	  in	  World	  War	  II.	  	  	  
Foreign	  Influences	  Roosevelt	  worked	  out	  the	  complications	  of	  what	  strategy	  to	  pursue	  during	  World	  War	  II	  with	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  Allied	  powers.	  These	  discussions	  occurred	  in	  various	  forms	  including	  letters,	  phone	  calls	  and	  conferences	  conducted	  all	  around	  the	  world.	  Almost	  every	  country	  possessed	  a	  different	  idea	  on	  where	  and	  when	  to	  strike	  according	  to	  what	  worked	  best	  for	  its	  individual	  country.	  Great	  Britain,	  France	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  all	  desired	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy	  in	  order	  to	  stop	  the	  German	  advance.	  China	  and	  Australia,	  however,	  hoped	  for	  a	  Pacific-­‐first	  strategy	  in	  order	  to	  halt	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  Japanese	  Empire.	  Each	  leader	  worked	  hard	  to	  advocate	  for	  a	  coalition	  strategy	  that	  benefitted	  their	  own	  country	  the	  most.	  Acknowledging	  the	  growing	  threat	  of	  another	  world	  war,	  Roosevelt	  “constantly	  sought	  contacts	  with	  foreign	  leaders	  and	  diplomats”83	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  their	  input	  and	  create	  a	  plan	  that	  best	  protected	  American	  interests.	  The	  United	  States	  knew	  the	  importance	  of	  possessing	  allies	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  Germany	  and	  Japan,	  which	  led	  Roosevelt	  to	  promote	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy	  in	  order	  to	  save	  Great	  Britain	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  liberate	  France.	  Ultimately,	  the	  Allies	  decided	  Nazi	  Germany	  served	  as	  the	  greatest	  threat	  to	  the	  world	  and	  needed	  to	  be	  defeated	  as	  soon	  as	  possible.	  	  	  Because	  they	  possessed	  the	  closest	  relationship	  with	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  British	  enjoyed	  the	  most	  influence	  over	  Roosevelt’s	  war	  strategy.	  As	  Hitler	  consolidated	  his	  power	  in	  the	  late	  1930s	  and	  prepared	  Germany	  for	  a	  campaign	  to	  conquer	  Europe,	  various	  British	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officials	  attempted	  to	  push	  the	  United	  States	  toward	  involvement	  against	  the	  Nazis.	  The	  British	  did	  not	  hold	  the	  military	  might	  required	  to	  defeat	  the	  Nazis.	  They	  realized	  that	  a	  war	  against	  Germany	  “could	  not	  be	  won	  without	  the	  help	  of	  the	  United	  States.”84	  The	  American	  public,	  however,	  adhered	  to	  a	  strict	  policy	  of	  isolationism	  before	  1941.	  In	  order	  to	  receive	  American	  aid	  and	  military	  involvement,	  the	  British	  needed	  to	  tackle	  the	  difficult	  task	  of	  convincing	  the	  United	  States	  to	  abandon	  isolationism	  and	  adopt	  internationalism.	  	  Prime	  Minister	  Winston	  Churchill	  built	  the	  closest	  and	  most	  influential	  relationship	  with	  the	  United	  States	  through	  Roosevelt.	  Churchill	  impressed	  on	  Roosevelt	  the	  dire	  situation	  the	  Allies	  faced	  in	  Europe.	  In	  one	  letter	  in	  1940,	  Churchill	  likened	  Hitler’s	  attack	  on	  the	  Low	  Countries	  to	  the	  smashing	  of	  individual	  matchwoods.85	  He	  constantly	  asked	  Roosevelt	  for	  help	  in	  the	  war	  and	  refused	  to	  give	  up.	  The	  two	  leaders’	  correspondence	  from	  September	  1939	  to	  April	  1945	  included	  some	  “two	  thousand	  letters,	  memorandums,	  and	  messages.”86	  	  Roosevelt	  carefully	  considered	  Churchill’s	  pleas	  and	  valued	  his	  advice.	  Both	  men	  possessed	  a	  “willingness…to	  communicate	  from	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  war,”87	  which	  proved	  invaluable	  to	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  alliance.	  Roosevelt	  and	  Churchill	  mutually	  respected	  each	  other	  and	  valued	  one	  another’s	  input.	  Unlike	  many	  other	  relations	  between	  Roosevelt	  and	  foreign	  leaders,	  Roosevelt	  and	  Churchill	  actually	  “became	  friends.”88	  Roosevelt	  “expressed	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his	  warmth	  and	  friendship”89	  with	  Churchill	  on	  many	  occasions	  and	  showed	  a	  genuine	  caring	  for	  Churchill’s	  well	  being.	  In	  a	  letter,	  Roosevelt	  advised	  Churchill	  to	  take	  time	  off	  and	  “lay	  a	  few	  bricks	  or	  paint	  another	  picture.”90	  Churchill	  reciprocated	  Roosevelt’s	  warmth	  and	  explained	  the	  weight	  he	  attached	  to	  everything	  told	  him.91	  They	  built	  an	  unprecedented	  level	  of	  trust	  and	  established	  the	  strong	  Anglo-­‐American	  alliance.	  The	  leaders	  agreed	  to	  work	  together	  to	  form	  a	  war	  strategy	  that	  worked	  to	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  their	  respective	  countries,	  which	  resulted	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy.	  	  Throughout	  their	  correspondence,	  Churchill	  employed	  a	  number	  of	  tactics	  to	  help	  persuade	  Roosevelt.	  One	  of	  his	  favorite	  and	  most	  effective	  approaches	  involved	  depicting	  “an	  America	  alone	  against	  the	  dictators”92	  of	  the	  Axis	  powers,	  specifically	  Hitler.	  While	  many	  Americans	  had	  the	  misconception	  that	  the	  Atlantic	  and	  Pacific	  Oceans	  protected	  the	  United	  States	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world,	  leaders	  such	  as	  Roosevelt	  recognized	  the	  idea	  as	  a	  fantasy.	  The	  Prime	  Minister	  contributed	  to	  destroying	  the	  isolationist	  illusion	  by	  declaring	  that	  the	  weight	  of	  a	  “completely	  subjugated,	  Nazified	  Europe…may	  be	  more	  than	  we	  can	  bear.”93	  As	  France	  fell	  to	  the	  Nazi	  advance,	  Churchill	  urged	  Roosevelt	  to	  think	  about	  the	  consequences	  of	  Hitler	  gaining	  access	  to	  the	  French	  Naval	  Fleet.94	  With	  Japan	  capturing	  the	  resources	  of	  the	  East	  and	  Germany	  conquering	  the	  vast	  military	  and	  economic	  power	  of	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Europe,	  the	  United	  States	  faced	  threats	  from	  both	  sides.	  The	  United	  States	  could	  potentially	  handle	  the	  Japanese	  by	  themselves,	  but	  not	  a	  Nazi-­‐	  controlled	  Europe.	  Churchill	  wanted	  Roosevelt	  and	  the	  American	  public	  to	  wake	  up	  to	  the	  reality	  that	  if	  Germany	  brought	  war	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  Americans	  would	  require	  allies.	  In	  order	  to	  have	  any	  chance	  at	  securing	  allies,	  the	  United	  States	  needed	  to	  keep	  the	  few	  nations	  still	  resisting	  Hitler	  in	  the	  fight.	  	  Another	  method	  Churchill	  utilized	  in	  his	  quest	  to	  rally	  Roosevelt	  toward	  military	  action	  against	  Germany	  was	  to	  picture	  the	  British	  people	  as	  heroes	  willing	  to	  die	  to	  the	  last	  man	  in	  defense	  of	  their	  island.	  The	  British	  hoped	  to	  convince	  Americans	  that	  “backing	  Britain	  was	  a	  good	  bet.”95	  Churchill	  made	  his	  famous	  “We	  Shall	  Fight	  On	  the	  Beaches”	  speech	  on	  June	  4,	  1940	  after	  the	  evacuation	  of	  British	  and	  French	  forces	  at	  Dunkirk.	  The	  speech	  inspired	  his	  fellow	  countrymen	  and	  raised	  British	  morale,	  but	  Churchill	  also	  had	  another	  audience	  in	  mind,	  Americans.	  In	  this	  speech,	  he	  told	  the	  United	  States	  that	  the	  British	  “shall	  never	  surrender,”	  and	  if	  the	  British	  “Island	  or	  a	  large	  part	  of	  it	  were	  subjugated	  and	  starving,	  then	  our	  Empire	  beyond	  the	  seas,	  armed	  and	  guarded	  by	  the	  British	  Fleet,	  would	  carry	  on	  the	  struggle.”96	  Supporting	  the	  British	  equaled	  supporting	  an	  ally	  willing	  to	  do	  everything	  necessary	  to	  win	  the	  war.	  Painting	  the	  British	  as	  fighters	  to	  the	  end	  helped	  sway	  public	  opinion	  in	  the	  United	  States	  toward	  supporting	  the	  British	  against	  Hitler	  and	  the	  Nazis.	  	  Churchill	  employed	  a	  host	  of	  officials	  and	  agencies	  to	  aid	  him	  in	  his	  effort.	  Every	  British	  official	  understood	  that	  their	  country	  needed	  them	  to	  persuade	  their	  American	  counterparts	  to	  help	  against	  the	  Germans.	  British	  citizens	  from	  a	  wide	  range	  of	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backgrounds	  including	  filmmaking,	  espionage,	  diplomacy	  and	  politics	  crossed	  the	  pond	  to	  help	  convince	  the	  United	  States	  to	  enter	  the	  war	  against	  Germany.	  These	  British	  citizens	  proved	  especially	  effective.	  	  	  After	  Churchill,	  the	  British	  citizen	  with	  the	  most	  public	  influence	  in	  the	  United	  States	  was	  Philip	  Kerr,	  also	  known	  as	  Lord	  Lothian.	  Lord	  Lothian	  served	  as	  the	  British	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  United	  States	  from	  1939	  to	  his	  untimely	  death	  in	  1940.	  Unlike	  previous	  British	  ambassadors	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  Lord	  Lothian	  connected	  well	  with	  the	  American	  elite	  and	  the	  average	  American.	  He	  “was	  enamored	  [of]	  what	  he	  saw”97	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  greatly	  appreciated	  American	  culture.	  In	  fact,	  Lord	  Lothian	  encouraged	  British	  filmmakers	  and	  actors	  such	  as	  Alfred	  Hitchcock	  to	  stay	  in	  Hollywood	  and	  “promote	  Britain	  and	  its	  war	  effort.”98	  	  He	  understood	  the	  importance	  of	  movies	  in	  American	  culture.	  	  	  More	  generally,	  the	  ambassador	  recognized	  the	  importance	  of	  American	  media.	  He	  enjoyed	  great	  relations	  with	  important	  members	  of	  the	  media,	  which	  “ensured	  favorable	  coverage	  for	  his	  speeches	  and	  other	  utterances.”99	  His	  message	  was	  consistent.	  Defeating	  Germany	  required	  a	  joint	  effort	  by	  Britain	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  Lord	  Lothian	  held	  an	  “overriding	  faith	  in	  Anglo-­‐American	  cooperation.”100	  His	  message	  struck	  a	  chord	  with	  the	  American	  people	  and	  started	  to	  change	  public	  opinion.	  When	  Britain	  needed	  Lord	  Lothian	  the	  most,	  his	  “decades	  of	  American	  contacts	  proved	  their	  worth	  and	  his	  peculiar	  mix	  of	  talents	  came	  into	  full	  play.”101	  Lord	  Lothian	  helped	  change	  the	  American	  perception	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of	  the	  British	  and	  created	  friendly	  Anglo-­‐American	  relations	  between	  the	  elite	  and	  the	  average	  citizen.	  	   After	  the	  start	  of	  military	  conflict	  in	  Europe	  in	  1939,	  Churchill	  realized	  that	  Americans	  would	  not	  listen	  to	  British	  propaganda	  because	  many	  Americans	  believed	  that	  the	  “scheming	  duplicitous	  British…tricked”102	  the	  American	  public	  into	  getting	  involved	  in	  World	  War	  I.	  The	  British	  needed	  to	  “organize	  American	  public	  opinion	  in	  favour	  of	  aid	  to	  Britain”103	  without	  officially	  doing	  it	  themselves.	  The	  only	  practical	  option	  left	  to	  Churchill	  involved	  establishing	  a	  covert	  propaganda	  agency	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Canadian-­‐born	  British	  intelligence	  agent	  William	  Stephenson	  served	  as	  the	  first	  director	  of	  the	  British	  Security	  Coordination	  and	  began	  his	  work	  by	  forming	  good	  relations	  with	  many	  American	  officials.	  He	  started	  by	  forming	  a	  close	  rapport	  with	  Federal	  Bureau	  of	  Investigation	  Director	  J.	  Edgar	  Hoover.	  After	  only	  six	  months	  since	  the	  start	  of	  World	  War	  II	  in	  Europe,	  Stephenson	  and	  Hoover	  secured	  permission	  from	  Roosevelt	  to	  work	  toward	  “Anglo-­‐American	  cooperation	  in	  the	  intelligence	  field.”104	  The	  two	  men	  “provided	  valuable	  assistance”	  ”105	  to	  one	  another.	  Stephenson	  then	  targeted	  William	  Donovan	  as	  a	  potential	  “intermediary	  par	  excellence	  for	  negotiations	  with	  the	  White	  House.”106	  As	  a	  prominent	  public	  figure,	  a	  highly	  successful	  lawyer,	  and	  Medal	  of	  Honor	  recipient,	  Donovan	  “exercised	  considerable	  influence	  in	  the	  inner	  councils	  of	  the	  Roosevelt	  Administration,”107	  especially	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with	  Roosevelt.	  Donovan	  became	  a	  staunch	  ally	  and	  advocate	  for	  American	  aid	  to	  the	  British	  to	  use	  against	  the	  Germans.	  Stephenson’s	  relations	  proved	  paramount	  to	  the	  British	  Security	  Coordination’s	  success.	  After	  establishing	  powerful	  American	  allies,	  Stephenson	  turned	  the	  British	  Security	  Coordination’s	  efforts	  toward	  “fostering	  the	  cause	  of	  intervention”	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  also	  known	  as	  “Political	  Warfare.”108	  Again,	  Stephenson	  used	  his	  unique	  ability	  to	  form	  quick	  friendships	  to	  his	  advantage.	  These	  people	  included	  one	  of	  Roosevelt’s	  international	  affairs	  speechwriter	  Robert	  Sherwood,	  popular	  Republican	  politician	  Wendell	  L.	  Willkie,	  General	  John	  J.	  Pershing,	  and,	  A.	  H.	  Sulzberger,	  the	  publisher	  of	  the	  New	  York	  Times.109	  From	  politics	  to	  the	  media,	  Stephenson	  hoped	  to	  use	  the	  British	  Security	  Coordination	  to	  combat	  the	  American	  isolationists	  and	  support	  the	  American	  interventionists.	  .	  	  Agents	  of	  the	  British	  Security	  Coordination	  worked	  hard	  to	  uncover	  German	  activities	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  report	  them	  to	  the	  American	  public	  through	  their	  media	  contacts.	  The	  case	  of	  Doctor	  Gerhard	  Westrick	  serves	  as	  a	  perfect	  example.	  Westrick	  was	  a	  high-­‐level	  Nazi	  agent	  assigned	  to	  enlist	  the	  help	  of	  Nazi	  sympathizers	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  His	  specific	  assignment	  involved	  bribing	  oil	  executives	  to	  support	  the	  Nazis.110	  He	  entered	  the	  United	  States	  as	  a	  private	  citizen	  and	  began	  his	  assignment,	  but	  the	  British	  Security	  Coordination	  reported	  his	  true	  identity	  and	  activities	  to	  the	  New	  York	  Herald	  Tribune,	  which	  in	  turn	  published	  the	  story.	  The	  story	  spread	  all	  over	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  Westrick	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fled	  the	  United	  States.111	  Outrage	  from	  the	  American	  public	  against	  Nazi	  Germany	  spread	  wherever	  newspapers	  printed	  they	  story.	  	  Uncovering	  Nazi	  operations	  on	  American	  soil	  provided	  undeniable	  proof	  that	  Hitler	  had	  his	  eyes	  on	  the	  United	  States.	  Stephenson	  utilized	  the	  technique	  again	  and	  again;	  he	  uncovered	  damaging	  information	  of	  the	  Axis	  powers	  and	  “pass[ed]	  it	  along…to	  American	  news	  organizations.”112	  When	  undeniable	  proof	  did	  not	  exist,	  agents	  “forged	  documents”	  that	  “helped	  foment	  anti-­‐Nazi	  sentiment.”113	  Agents	  of	  the	  British	  Security	  Coordination	  hoped	  to	  “”rip	  off	  the	  disguise	  of	  German-­‐inspired	  subversive	  propaganda”114	  and	  expose	  the	  Nazi	  threat	  to	  the	  American	  public.	  With	  help	  from	  interventionists,	  Stephenson	  and	  the	  British	  Security	  Coordination	  used	  propaganda	  to	  ignite	  rage	  against	  Hitler	  and	  the	  Nazis	  among	  the	  American	  public	  and	  generate	  greater	  support	  for	  the	  British.	  	  In	  January	  of	  1941,	  the	  Roosevelt	  Administration	  responded	  to	  the	  constant	  British	  pleas	  for	  increased	  assistance	  from	  the	  United	  States.	  For	  the	  next	  three	  months,	  British	  and	  American	  military	  officials	  conducted	  a	  series	  of	  secret	  meetings	  in	  Washington	  D.C.	  known	  as	  the	  ABC-­‐1	  conference.	  The	  Americans	  agreed	  to	  the	  ABC-­‐1	  Conference	  in	  order	  to	  explore	  the	  possibility	  of	  an	  Anglo-­‐American	  alliance	  should	  the	  United	  States	  be	  forced	  to	  enter	  the	  war.	  During	  the	  conference,	  British	  representatives	  pushed	  for	  a	  decision	  on	  accepting	  the	  “European	  theatre	  as	  the	  vital	  theatre.”115	  With	  Europe	  serving	  as	  the	  vital	  theater,	  the	  British	  also	  believed	  that	  the	  “general	  policy	  should	  therefore	  be	  to	  defeat	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  111	  Stephenson,	  British	  Security	  Coordination,	  56-­‐57.	  112	  Olson,	  Those	  Angry	  Days,	  120.	  113	  Ibid,	  116.	  	  114	  Stephenson,	  British	  Security	  Coordination,	  66.	  115	  Maurice	  Matloff,	  and	  Edwin	  M.	  Snell,	  Strategic	  Planning	  for	  Coalition	  Warfare,	  1941-­‐1942.	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Center	  of	  Military	  History,	  U.S.	  Army,	  1999),34.	  
	  	   33	  
Germany	  and	  Italy	  first,	  and	  then	  deal	  with	  Japan.”116	  American	  military	  leaders	  favored	  the	  British	  suggestions	  and	  reported	  their	  opinion	  to	  Roosevelt.	  The	  ABC-­‐1	  Conference	  marked	  the	  first	  time	  British	  military	  officials	  met	  face	  to	  face	  with	  American	  officials	  in	  honestly	  pursuing	  an	  Anglo-­‐American	  alliance.	  	  On	  June	  22,	  1941,	  the	  Nazis	  commenced	  Hitler’s	  Operation	  BARBAROSSA	  and	  invaded	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  At	  first,	  the	  Germans	  made	  swift	  advances	  into	  Soviet	  territory,	  and	  it	  appeared	  that	  Premier	  Joseph	  Stalin	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  fall.	  The	  Soviets	  eventually	  held	  off	  the	  Nazi	  invasion	  short	  of	  Moscow.	  Stalin	  lacked	  the	  adequate	  supplies	  to	  arm	  the	  vast	  Soviet	  military	  and	  like	  the	  British,	  turned	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  Not	  only	  did	  the	  Soviets	  require	  arms,	  but	  money	  as	  well.117	  Many	  Americans	  did	  not	  like	  the	  Soviets	  and	  mistrusted	  Stalin	  and	  his	  policies	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  but	  Roosevelt	  had	  a	  “hunch	  that	  backing	  the	  Soviets	  might	  be	  worth	  the	  gamble”118	  and	  decided	  to	  help	  them	  with	  supplies.	  The	  Nazis	  imposed	  heavy	  casualties	  on	  the	  Red	  Army,	  and	  Stalin	  desired	  a	  second	  front	  to	  relieve	  pressure	  on	  his	  troops.	  Through	  their	  correspondence,	  Stalin	  made	  clear	  to	  Roosevelt	  the	  many	  sacrifices	  made	  by	  Soviet	  soldiers.	  In	  one	  letter,	  he	  warned	  Roosevelt	  of	  a	  likely	  pre-­‐winter	  push	  by	  the	  Germans	  against	  Soviet	  lines,	  which	  already	  experienced	  heavy	  combat	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Nazis.119	  The	  Soviet	  leader	  appealed	  for	  American	  military	  action	  against	  Germany	  in	  order	  to	  relieve	  pressure	  on	  his	  overburdened	  troops.	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General	  Charles	  de	  Gaulle,	  leader	  of	  Free	  France,	  also	  made	  appeals	  to	  the	  United	  States	  to	  follow	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy.	  He	  believed	  “all	  was	  lost	  in	  Europe	  only	  until	  America	  could	  be	  induced	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  war.”120	  The	  Free	  France	  government	  needed	  the	  military	  force	  and	  industrial	  might	  of	  the	  United	  States	  to	  move	  against	  Germany	  in	  order	  to	  reenter	  France.	  Unfortunately	  for	  de	  Gaulle,	  the	  Free	  France	  administration	  did	  not	  hold	  much	  political	  clout	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Divisions	  among	  the	  Gaullist	  delegation	  and	  an	  anti-­‐French	  attitude	  among	  many	  American	  politicians	  caused	  most	  French	  pleas	  to	  go	  unheard.121	  Regardless,	  de	  Gaulle	  hoped	  for	  Americans	  to	  “turn	  the	  tide	  of	  the	  war”122	  like	  they	  did	  in	  World	  War	  I.	  He	  encouraged	  his	  diplomatic	  representatives	  in	  the	  United	  States	  to	  continue	  to	  ask	  for	  American	  military	  action	  against	  Germany.	  Free	  France	  representatives	  complied	  and	  added	  another	  voice	  to	  the	  growing	  number	  of	  foreign	  dignitaries	  asking	  for	  the	  United	  States	  to	  intervene	  against	  Hitler	  and	  Nazi	  Germany.	  	  Considering	  the	  appeals	  made	  by	  Britain,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  Free	  France,	  Roosevelt	  agreed	  to	  a	  conference	  with	  Churchill	  in	  August	  1941	  to	  discuss	  the	  current	  war.	  Both	  leaders	  brought	  their	  highest-­‐level	  military	  advisors	  and	  discussed	  the	  implications	  of	  a	  Nazi-­‐dominated	  Europe.123	  	  	  Churchill’s	  primary	  goal	  in	  negotiating	  with	  Roosevelt	  during	  the	  Atlantic	  Conference	  was	  to	  convince	  him	  to	  declare	  war	  against	  Germany.124	  His	  hopes	  rested	  on	  “further	  ensnaring	  the	  United	  States	  in	  a	  web	  of	  connections	  and	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commitments”125	  designed	  to	  create	  conflict	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Germany.	  Constant	  German	  victories	  in	  Europe	  and	  the	  massive	  barrage	  by	  German	  bombers	  during	  the	  Battle	  of	  Britain	  devastated	  the	  British	  and	  destroyed	  major	  portions	  of	  the	  urban	  centers	  on	  the	  British	  Isle.	  Many	  citizens	  died,	  but	  the	  British	  held	  strong.	  The	  British	  people	  desperately	  needed	  a	  morale	  boost,	  and	  Churchill	  hoped	  to	  provide	  it	  through	  American	  intervention.	  Roosevelt	  refused	  Churchill’s	  suggestion,	  but	  the	  resulting	  Atlantic	  Charter	  cemented	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  alliance	  and	  hinted	  at	  the	  United	  States	  entering	  the	  war	  against	  Hitler	  and	  the	  Nazis.	  In	  fact,	  a	  telegram	  drafted	  by	  Roosevelt	  and	  Churchill	  about	  the	  Atlantic	  Charter	  mentioned	  the	  “dangers	  to	  world	  civilization	  arising	  from	  the	  policies	  of	  military	  domination	  by	  conquest	  upon	  which	  the	  Hitlerite	  Government	  of	  Germany	  and	  other	  Governments	  associated	  therewith	  have	  embarked.”126	  The	  only	  enemy	  addressed	  by	  name	  in	  the	  telegram	  was	  Germany.	  Roosevelt	  and	  Churchill	  did	  not	  even	  mention	  the	  Japanese	  Empire.	  Churchill	  may	  have	  failed	  to	  bring	  the	  United	  States	  into	  the	  war,	  but	  he	  achieved	  minor	  success	  by	  influencing	  Roosevelt	  to	  declare	  Hitler	  as	  the	  primary	  enemy.	  	  Pearl	  Harbor	  formally	  brought	  the	  United	  States	  into	  World	  War	  II.	  Three	  days	  later,	  Hitler	  led	  Germany	  in	  a	  declaration	  of	  war	  against	  the	  United	  States	  and	  solved	  another	  question	  on	  how	  to	  convince	  the	  United	  States	  to	  also	  fight	  Germany.	  Japan	  and	  Germany	  officially	  made	  the	  decision	  for	  the	  United	  States.	  Once	  the	  United	  States	  was	  engaging	  in	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military	  action,	  the	  British,	  Soviets	  and	  Free	  France	  needed	  to	  convince	  the	  United	  States	  that	  Germany	  needed	  to	  be	  forced	  into	  surrender	  first.	  	   Immediately	  after	  Pearl	  Harbor,	  Churchill	  asked	  for	  a	  conference	  with	  Roosevelt.	  The	  Japanese	  finally	  forced	  the	  United	  States	  into	  the	  war,	  but	  Churchill	  feared	  the	  United	  States	  might	  adopt	  a	  Pacific-­‐first	  strategy.127	  Roosevelt	  agreed	  to	  a	  conference	  and	  the	  two	  leaders	  and	  their	  advisers	  all	  met	  in	  Washington	  D.C.	  between	  December	  1941	  and	  January	  1942	  to	  discuss	  the	  American-­‐British	  grand	  strategy	  in	  the	  ARCADIA	  Conference.	  Again,	  Churchill	  exerted	  his	  influence	  on	  Roosevelt	  and	  stayed	  in	  the	  White	  House	  for	  nearly	  three	  weeks	  straight.128	  	  	   The	  talks	  turned	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  British	  and	  their	  hope	  for	  the	  United	  States	  agreeing	  to	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy	  came	  to	  fruition.	  The	  British	  and	  Americans	  “agreed	  that	  Germany	  was	  the	  predominant	  member	  of	  the	  Axis	  powers	  and	  consequently	  the	  Atlantic	  and	  European	  area	  was	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  decisive	  theatre.”129	  This	  served	  as	  the	  first	  time	  the	  United	  States	  publically	  and	  officially	  committed	  to	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy	  in	  the	  war.	  The	  conferees	  then	  discussed	  the	  importance	  of	  supporting	  Stalin	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  with	  as	  much	  materiel	  as	  possible	  to	  keep	  the	  Germans	  occupied	  in	  the	  eastern	  front.	  British	  and	  Americans	  leaders	  also	  debated	  the	  timing	  of	  an	  invasion	  of	  the	  European	  continent.	  Everyone	  decided	  that	  an	  invasion	  of	  the	  European	  continent	  by	  British	  and	  American	  military	  forces	  seemed	  unlikely	  at	  the	  time	  and	  that	  “a	  return	  to	  the	  Continent”130	  appeared	  more	  feasible	  in	  1943.	  Throughout	  his	  time	  in	  Washington,	  Churchill	  promoted	  “a	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  128	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  and	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  Department	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series	  of	  invasions	  of	  German-­‐held	  Europe	  starting	  in	  1943”131	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  the	  Americans	  committed	  to	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy.	  Various	  invasion	  locations	  show	  up	  in	  the	  ARCADIA	  Conference	  memorandum	  such	  as	  the	  Balkans,	  Italy	  and	  Western	  Europe,	  but	  the	  Allies	  did	  not	  decide	  on	  an	  actual	  location	  at	  that	  time.	  	   	  Though	  the	  Allies	  tentatively	  agreed	  to	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy	  in	  1941,	  questions	  complicated	  its	  development.	  These	  questions	  included	  how	  and	  to	  whom	  resources	  should	  be	  allocated,	  which	  country’s	  personnel	  would	  be	  in	  command	  and	  most	  importantly,	  where	  should	  the	  counterattack	  against	  Germany	  begin.	  Again,	  every	  nation	  fought	  for	  their	  own	  country’s	  interests,	  which	  resulted	  in	  considerable	  tension.	  This	  tension	  led	  to	  constant	  revisions	  to	  the	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy,	  and	  sometimes	  the	  tension	  seemed	  likely	  to	  cause	  the	  United	  States	  to	  revert	  to	  a	  Pacific-­‐first	  strategy.	  	  After	  deciding	  on	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy	  at	  the	  ARCADIA	  Conference,	  the	  question	  of	  where	  to	  invade	  the	  continent	  of	  Europe	  dominated	  the	  next	  series	  of	  talks	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  other	  Allies.	  Stalin	  and	  his	  Soviet	  advisers	  badly	  wanted	  a	  second	  front	  opened	  in	  Western	  Europe	  as	  early	  as	  1942.	  People’s	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Vyacheslav	  Molotov	  repeatedly	  explained	  that	  the	  difficulties	  of	  establishing	  another	  front	  in	  Western	  Europe	  would	  “not	  be	  any	  less	  in	  1943.”132	  He	  said	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  held	  a	  solid	  line	  against	  the	  Germans	  on	  the	  eastern	  front	  and	  the	  opportune	  time	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Allies	  to	  attack	  was	  sometime	  in	  1942.	  Roosevelt	  instructed	  Molotov	  on	  May	  30,	  1942	  to	  tell	  Stalin	  that	  American	  troops	  would	  land	  on	  the	  European	  continent	  in	  1942	  and	  create	  a	  second	  front.	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   The	  next	  day,	  however,	  Roosevelt	  revised	  his	  earlier	  declaration	  and	  asked	  Molotov	  to	  consider	  receiving	  reduced	  military	  aid	  from	  the	  United	  States	  in	  order	  to	  bolster	  troops	  and	  supplies	  in	  England	  for	  a	  1942	  Channel	  crossing	  into	  Nazi-­‐	  occupied	  France.	  The	  United	  States	  did	  not	  possess	  enough	  transport	  ships	  to	  move	  all	  the	  men	  and	  supplies	  needed	  to	  continue	  Soviet	  aid	  at	  current	  levels	  and	  prepare	  for	  a	  massive	  invasion.	  Molotov	  responded	  with	  no	  enthusiasm	  and	  questioned	  whether	  the	  United	  States	  intended	  on	  opening	  another	  front	  in	  1942.	  He	  insisted	  “the	  second	  front	  would	  be	  stronger	  if	  the	  first	  front	  stood	  fast.”133	  Again,	  Roosevelt	  promised	  Stalin	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  that	  the	  Americans,	  along	  with	  British	  support,	  would	  establish	  a	  second	  front	  in	  Western	  Europe.	  	   Churchill	  strongly	  opposed	  that	  proposal.	  A	  cross-­‐	  Channel	  landing	  involved	  putting	  thousands	  of	  British	  soldiers	  at	  risk,	  and	  Britain	  already	  had	  lost	  an	  entire	  generation	  in	  World	  War	  I.	  Invading	  through	  France	  did	  not	  meet	  the	  British	  objectives	  of	  saving	  their	  Middle	  Eastern	  and	  Balkan	  interests	  as	  well.	  On	  July	  8,	  1942,	  Churchill	  and	  the	  British	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  officially	  vetoed	  any	  plan	  to	  invade	  the	  European	  continent	  across	  the	  Channel	  by	  the	  end	  of	  1942.	  The	  Prime	  Minister	  reasoned	  that	  not	  one	  of	  his	  military	  commanders	  believed	  an	  Allied	  invasion	  of	  France	  to	  be	  “a	  practicable	  operation	  in	  1942.”134	  He	  also	  explained	  that	  any	  attempt	  at	  such	  an	  assault	  in	  1942	  would	  ruin	  any	  possibility	  of	  mounting	  a	  well-­‐organized	  large-­‐scale	  attack	  against	  the	  European	  continent	  in	  1943.	  	   Another	  idea	  Churchill	  suggested	  in	  his	  letter	  to	  Roosevelt	  and	  his	  advisers	  was	  Operation	  GYMNAST.	  Operation	  GYMNAST,	  which	  became	  known	  as	  Operation	  TORCH,	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involved	  an	  Allied	  invasion	  of	  French	  North	  Africa	  and	  a	  push	  westward	  in	  order	  to	  remove	  the	  Germans	  from	  the	  African	  continent.	  This	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  a	  European	  invasion	  up	  through	  what	  Churchill	  called	  “the	  soft	  underbelly	  of	  Europe,”	  better	  known	  as	  Italy.	  Such	  an	  attack	  technically	  created	  the	  second	  front	  Stalin	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  desperately	  needed.	  Hitler	  would	  need	  to	  divert	  important	  resources	  and	  manpower	  from	  the	  eastern	  front	  to	  protect	  Italy.	  An	  invasion	  through	  Italy	  might	  also	  reduce	  British	  casualties.	  Churchill	  called	  the	  plan	  “the	  safest	  and	  most	  fruitful	  stroke	  that	  can	  be	  delivered	  this	  autumn.”135	  	  	   Roosevelt	  and	  Churchill	  agreed	  to	  the	  British	  plan	  for	  an	  Allied	  invasion	  of	  French	  North	  Africa.	  The	  Allied	  attack	  against	  French	  North	  Africa	  succeeded	  in	  expelling	  Axis	  forces	  from	  North	  Africa,	  but	  it	  took	  longer	  than	  expected.	  The	  war	  in	  the	  Pacific	  started	  to	  take	  attention	  away	  from	  Europe	  and	  the	  United	  States	  seemed	  likely	  to	  give	  up	  on	  the	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy.	  Stalin	  reported	  his	  growing	  exasperation	  with	  the	  lack	  of	  commitment	  to	  opening	  a	  Western	  European	  front.	  He	  “definitely	  disapproved”	  of	  the	  Americans	  thinking	  about	  launching	  an	  all-­‐	  out	  attack	  against	  the	  Japanese	  because	  it	  would	  “divert	  material	  and	  force”136	  from	  the	  European	  theater.	  General	  Hurley	  relayed	  that	  Stalin	  “stressed	  the	  paramount	  importance	  of	  the	  defeat	  of	  Hitler	  first.”137	  The	  Allies	  needed	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  to	  stay	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  Germany,	  and	  a	  Pacific-­‐first	  strategy	  did	  nothing	  to	  benefit	  the	  Soviets.	  	  After	  securing	  North	  Africa,	  questions	  resurfaced	  on	  where	  to	  attack	  next.	  The	  Allies	  knew	  the	  next	  attack	  required	  invading	  Europe	  in	  order	  to	  save	  the	  Soviets.	  British	  and	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American	  leaders	  debated	  over	  future	  strategy	  at	  the	  Casablanca	  Conference	  in	  January	  of	  1943.	  Stalin	  did	  not	  make	  it	  to	  the	  conference	  because	  of	  developments	  along	  the	  eastern	  front.	  After	  long	  hours	  of	  discussion,	  Roosevelt	  agreed	  to	  the	  British	  plan	  for	  a	  sweep	  northward	  through	  Italy	  instead	  of	  a	  mass	  landing	  in	  France.	  An	  invasion	  across	  the	  Channel	  would	  take	  too	  long	  to	  plan	  and	  execute,	  and	  Roosevelt	  demanded	  more	  immediate	  military	  action	  against	  Germany.	  The	  plan	  named	  Operation	  HUSKY	  called	  for	  the	  “occupation	  of	  Sicily	  with	  the	  object	  of	  diverting	  German	  pressure	  from	  the	  Russian	  front.”138	  British	  and	  American	  leaders	  finalized	  their	  war	  strategy	  and	  prepared	  for	  the	  attack	  on	  Germany	  and	  Italian	  occupied	  Sicily.	  	  	   	  Because	  British	  and	  American	  forces	  took	  their	  time	  in	  assembling	  the	  necessary	  materials	  and	  personal	  for	  Operation	  HUSKY,	  the	  Soviets	  grew	  more	  and	  more	  impatient.	  Churchill	  and	  Roosevelt	  had	  promised	  Stalin	  a	  second	  front	  in	  Europe	  in	  1943,	  but	  no	  second	  front	  yet	  existed.	  Thousands	  of	  Red	  Army	  soldiers	  and	  Soviet	  civilians	  died	  in	  fierce	  battle	  with	  the	  Germans	  everyday,	  and	  the	  Soviets	  required	  some	  relief.	  The	  Soviets	  started	  to	  mistrust	  the	  intentions	  of	  the	  Americans	  and	  British	  and	  feared	  that	  they	  already	  abandoned	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy.	  	  In	  June	  1943,	  Stalin	  sent	  a	  stern	  message	  to	  his	  counterparts	  reminding	  them	  of	  their	  promise	  to	  open	  a	  second	  front.	  Stalin	  and	  the	  Soviets	  felt	  insulted	  and	  betrayed	  that	  the	  British	  and	  Americans	  decided	  to	  move	  back	  the	  date	  of	  the	  European	  invasion	  at	  a	  conference	  in	  Washington	  D.C.	  “without	  Soviet	  participation	  and	  without	  inviting	  its	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  138	  United	  States	  Department	  of	  State,	  FRUS:	  Conferences	  at	  Washington,	  1941-­‐1942,	  and	  
Casablanca,	  1943,	  Volume	  III	  (Washington	  D.C.:	  United	  States	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  1968),	  775.	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representatives.”139	  In	  the	  message,	  Stalin	  reminded	  Roosevelt	  that	  the	  Allies	  moved	  back	  opening	  a	  second	  front	  in	  Europe	  from	  the	  original	  promise	  of	  1942	  to	  1944.140	  	  The	  Soviets	  felt	  like	  the	  other	  Allies	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  understand	  or	  did	  not	  care	  about	  the	  direness	  of	  the	  Soviet	  situation.	  The	  Soviets	  begged	  for	  a	  second	  front	  in	  Europe,	  but	  the	  Americans	  and	  British	  kept	  making	  empty	  promises.	  The	  Allied	  nations	  agreed	  to	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy,	  but	  the	  Soviets	  believed	  they	  were	  the	  only	  ones	  putting	  the	  strategy	  into	  action.	  The	  Allies	  needed	  to	  be	  able	  to	  trust	  the	  other	  nations	  and	  their	  leaders	  in	  the	  alliance	  and	  support	  each	  other	  to	  beat	  the	  might	  of	  the	  Axis	  powers.	  	  	   Other	  Allies	  started	  to	  feel	  the	  pressure	  as	  well.	  Countries	  such	  as	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand	  “demanded	  a	  return	  of	  their	  forces...and	  a	  reversal	  of	  the	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy.”141	  China	  pleaded	  for	  more	  aid	  and	  warned	  the	  Allies	  of	  a	  Chinese	  “collapse	  or	  separate	  peace.”142	  These	  countries	  sacrificed	  protecting	  their	  own	  nations	  and	  peoples	  for	  the	  good	  of	  the	  larger	  Alliance.	  To	  them,	  the	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy	  failed	  or	  took	  too	  long	  to	  complete.	  Japan	  took	  advantage	  of	  the	  Allied	  preoccupation	  with	  Germany	  and	  pushed	  forward	  with	  their	  plans	  to	  dominate	  the	  Pacific.	  The	  Pacific	  Allies	  needed	  help	  against	  Japan	  and	  swiftly.	  The	  Allies	  needed	  to	  take	  action	  and	  focus	  most	  of	  their	  energies	  on	  one	  theater	  of	  the	  war	  and	  break	  up	  the	  Axis	  powers	  one	  by	  one.	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  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  of	  the	  U.S.S.R.,	  Correspondence	  Between	  the	  Chairman	  of	  the	  
Council	  of	  Ministers	  of	  the	  U.S.S.R.	  and	  the	  Presidents	  of	  the	  U.S.A.	  and	  the	  Prime	  Ministers	  of	  
Great	  Britain	  During	  the	  Great	  Patriotic	  War	  of	  1941-­‐1945,),	  76.	  140	  Joseph	  Stalin,	  “Letter,	  Joseph	  Stalin	  to	  FDR	  re:	  Second	  Front,	  June	  11,	  1943,”	  from	  Archivists	  of	  the	  Franklin	  D.	  Roosevelt	  Library	  and	  Museum,	  Significant	  Documents	  
Collection,	  Series	  1,	  Box	  1,	  Document	  55,	  http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/archives/	  collections/franklin/?p=collections/findingaid&id=510.	  141	  Stoler,	  Allies	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  Adversaries,	  67.	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   After	  many	  conferences	  and	  countless	  debates,	  the	  British,	  Soviets	  and	  Free	  French	  succeeded	  in	  convincing	  the	  United	  States	  to	  adopt	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy.	  They	  utilized	  many	  different	  tactics	  and	  methods	  to	  persuade	  Roosevelt	  and	  the	  American	  public.	  They	  used	  their	  closer	  diplomatic	  ties	  to	  woo	  American	  officials	  to	  their	  side.	  They	  also	  used	  the	  political	  power	  of	  their	  military	  power	  to	  influence	  the	  United	  States.	  The	  arguments	  made	  by	  the	  pro-­‐	  Europe	  countries	  appealed	  to	  American	  leaders	  and	  made	  the	  most	  sense	  to	  Roosevelt.	  Ultimately,	  the	  European	  powers	  opposing	  Hitler	  exerted	  crucial	  influence	  over	  Roosevelt’s	  decision	  to	  move	  the	  United	  States	  toward	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy	  in	  World	  War	  II.	  	  
Military	  Influence	  	   Military	  advisers	  hold	  some	  of	  most	  influential	  positions	  in	  terms	  of	  developing	  military	  strategy.	  The	  generals	  and	  admirals	  use	  their	  training	  and	  experiences	  to	  develop	  the	  different	  options	  that	  the	  military	  will	  use	  in	  various	  engagements	  and	  wars.	  No	  one	  in	  the	  government	  better	  understands	  how	  to	  win	  a	  war	  than	  the	  people	  who	  command	  military	  forces.	  They	  know	  what	  variables	  to	  consider	  when	  assessing	  enemies,	  including	  number	  of	  soldiers,	  technology,	  resources	  tactics	  and	  geography.	  The	  lives	  of	  their	  men	  and	  the	  future	  of	  their	  country	  depend	  on	  their	  capabilities	  to	  assess	  potential	  threats	  and	  create	  the	  best	  strategies	  accordingly.	  In	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  President	  relies	  heavily	  on	  the	  advice	  of	  high-­‐ranking	  military	  officials	  from	  each	  branch	  of	  the	  military.	  Roosevelt	  constantly	  consulted	  with	  his	  advisers	  and	  found	  that	  the	  heads	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Army	  and	  United	  States	  Navy	  believed	  in	  different	  strategies	  for	  the	  United	  States	  to	  follow	  in	  order	  to	  win	  World	  War	  II.	  Ultimately,	  the	  President	  followed	  the	  advice	  of	  the	  majority	  of	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his	  military	  advisors	  and	  decided	  on	  “the	  most	  important	  single	  strategic	  concept	  of	  the	  war”143	  by	  choosing	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy	  in	  World	  War	  II.	  	  After	  the	  end	  of	  World	  War	  I,	  government	  and	  military	  officials	  wanted	  a	  cooperative	  effort	  by	  American	  military	  leaders	  to	  analyze	  current	  and	  potential	  threats	  to	  American	  security.	  As	  a	  result,	  representatives	  from	  the	  Army	  and	  Navy	  formed	  the	  Joint	  Board	  and	  the	  advisory	  Joint	  Planning	  Committee.	  They	  set	  to	  work	  and	  established	  strategies	  based	  on	  various	  threats	  known	  as	  the	  Color	  Plans.	  As	  early	  as	  the	  1920s,	  the	  Joint	  Board	  recognized	  Japan	  as	  the	  most	  “probable	  enemy”144	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  created	  War	  Plan	  ORANGE.	  American	  military	  strategists	  labeled	  the	  Japanese	  Empire	  as	  a	  major	  threat	  before	  they	  even	  thought	  to	  include	  Germany	  in	  their	  plans.	  Germany	  suffered	  immensely	  under	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Versailles	  and	  was	  stripped	  of	  its	  military	  capabilities.	  At	  the	  time,	  the	  Joint	  Board	  did	  not	  recognize	  any	  European	  nation	  as	  an	  immediate	  threat	  because	  of	  the	  ongoing	  political	  turmoil.	  	   One	  of	  the	  most	  important	  features	  of	  the	  Color	  Plans	  involved	  one	  European	  nation,	  Great	  Britain.	  Though	  highly	  unlikely,	  the	  military	  planners	  of	  the	  Joint	  Board	  created	  a	  strategy	  based	  on	  a	  war	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  an	  alliance	  between	  Great	  Britain	  and	  Japan	  known	  as	  Plan	  ORANGE-­‐RED.	  Plan	  ORANGE-­‐RED	  called	  for	  American	  forces	  to	  “stand	  on	  the	  defensive	  in	  the	  Pacific”145	  and	  allocate	  a	  majority	  of	  military	  force	  and	  resources	  to	  the	  Atlantic	  Ocean.	  The	  Joint	  Board	  agreed	  that	  the	  “vital	  areas	  of	  the	  United	  States	  were	  located	  in	  the	  northeast”146	  and	  needed	  protective	  priority.	  This	  strategy	  was	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  Louis	  Morton,	  Germany	  First:	  The	  Basic	  Concept	  of	  Allied	  Strategy	  in	  World	  War	  II.	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Center	  of	  Military	  History,	  U.S.	  Army,	  1990),	  11.	  144	  Ibid,	  14.	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  Ibid,	  17.	  146Ibid,	  17.	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very	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  the	  United	  States	  adopted	  during	  World	  War	  II,	  with	  the	  replacement	  of	  Great	  Britain	  with	  Germany.	  Plan	  ORANGE-­‐RED	  laid	  the	  foundation	  for	  placing	  more	  strategic	  importance	  on	  the	  Atlantic	  Ocean	  and	  Europe	  over	  the	  Pacific	  Ocean	  and	  Asia.	  	  	   Military	  leaders	  first	  created	  the	  Color	  Plans	  at	  a	  time	  when	  Germany	  posed	  no	  threat	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  But	  Hitler’s	  rise	  to	  power	  swiftly	  changed	  Germany’s	  status	  in	  the	  world	  and	  caused	  the	  United	  States	  to	  take	  a	  cautionary	  interest	  in	  German	  military	  development.	  The	  United	  States	  sent	  Colonel	  Truman	  Smith	  to	  Berlin	  as	  a	  military	  attaché	  and	  ordered	  him	  to	  report	  on	  German	  rearmament.147	  Smith	  had	  already	  been	  stationed	  in	  Germany	  in	  the	  1920s	  and	  had	  the	  most	  experience	  with	  Germany	  and	  its	  military.	  Smith’s	  expertise	  on	  the	  German	  military	  and	  his	  findings	  helped	  convince	  American	  military	  personnel	  to	  view	  Germany	  as	  a	  serious	  threat	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  	  	   Throughout	  his	  post	  as	  the	  military	  attaché	  to	  Germany,	  Smith	  discovered	  the	  alarming	  growing	  power	  of	  the	  German	  military.	  Once	  in	  Berlin	  in	  1935,	  Smith	  observed	  that	  Hitler	  no	  longer	  considered	  Germany	  “bound	  by	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Versailles	  Treaty.”148	  The	  Nazis	  dedication	  to	  rearmament	  allowed	  Germany	  to	  rapidly	  recover	  economically	  and	  develop	  vast	  industrial	  capabilities.	  The	  swift	  economic	  transformation	  of	  Germany	  opened	  up	  opportunities	  for	  the	  Nazis	  to	  procure	  the	  commodities	  necessary	  to	  wage	  a	  major	  war.	  Smith	  reported	  on	  “specific	  gains	  in	  areas	  such	  as	  iron,	  gasoline,	  and	  oil”	  and	  on	  Germany’s	  concentration	  on	  developing	  “synthetic	  substitutes.”149	  Hitler	  hoped	  to	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  Henry	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create	  a	  self-­‐sustaining	  German	  economy	  to	  support	  his	  future	  war.150	  The	  idea	  of	  a	  self-­‐sustaining	  Germany	  greatly	  concerned	  Smith	  and	  other	  American	  military	  officials.	  Japan	  relied	  on	  American	  oil	  to	  operate	  its	  modern	  military,	  which	  put	  the	  Japanese	  military	  at	  the	  mercy	  of	  American	  trade.	  Germany	  could	  launch	  and	  maintain	  a	  massive	  war	  with	  its	  own	  resources,	  which	  helped	  put	  Germany	  ahead	  of	  Japan	  as	  a	  major	  threat.	  	  In	  1936,	  Smith	  expressed	  special	  concern	  over	  the	  impressive	  military	  might	  of	  the	  German	  Air	  Force	  known	  as	  the	  Luftwaffe.	  He	  concluded	  that	  the	  “German	  aircraft	  industry	  had	  a	  productive	  capacity	  two	  and	  one	  half	  times	  of	  that	  of	  either	  Great	  Britain	  or	  the	  United	  States.”151	  Smith	  wrote	  to	  Colonel	  Charles	  Lindbergh	  and	  invited	  him	  to	  come	  to	  Berlin	  and	  confirm	  his	  assessment	  of	  the	  Luftwaffe.	  In	  his	  letter,	  Smith	  stressed	  the	  “high	  patriotic	  benefit”152	  of	  Lindbergh’s	  examination	  of	  German	  air	  power.	  Lindbergh	  agreed	  and	  along	  with	  Smith	  took	  an	  extensive	  tour	  of	  German	  air	  facilities.	  Smith	  chronicled	  their	  tour	  in	  his	  diary	  and	  wrote	  that	  they	  agreed,	  “German	  aviation…was	  coming	  of	  age.”153	  	  Hitler’s	  colossal	  rearmament	  program	  caused	  Smith	  to	  report	  that	  Germany	  clearly	  intended	  to	  start	  a	  war	  in	  Europe	  and	  possibly	  more.	  The	  Nazis	  accumulated	  the	  required	  resources	  to	  launch	  major	  military	  campaigns	  and	  developed	  new	  technologies	  to	  create	  a	  more	  self-­‐reliant	  economy.	  The	  German	  Army	  expanded	  quickly	  and	  underwent	  quality	  training.	  The	  Luftwaffe	  already	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  formidable	  force,	  with	  Hitler	  demanding	  continued	  improvements	  and	  additions	  every	  year.	  Soon,	  the	  Luftwaffe	  became	  the	  dominant	  air	  power	  in	  Europe,	  and	  possibly	  the	  world.	  If	  the	  United	  States	  did	  not	  begin	  to	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rearm	  as	  well,	  Germany	  could	  soon	  surpass	  American	  military	  power	  and	  prove	  to	  be	  the	  biggest	  threat	  to	  American	  security.	  	  	   As	  events	  unfolded	  in	  the	  late	  1930s	  and	  new	  information	  came	  in	  from	  Europe	  and	  Asia,	  the	  Joint	  Board	  realized	  they	  needed	  to	  revise	  Plan	  ORANGE.	  The	  global	  situation	  had	  changed	  drastically	  from	  the	  1920s,	  and	  new	  threats	  existed	  to	  American	  security.	  Japan	  still	  stood	  as	  the	  most	  likely	  adversary	  but	  Germany	  now	  served	  as	  a	  likely	  enemy	  as	  well	  because	  of	  the	  Axis	  Alliance.	  A	  war	  with	  one	  member	  might	  result	  in	  a	  war	  with	  both.	  Germany	  also	  looked	  likely	  to	  replace	  Japan	  as	  the	  most	  powerful	  military	  threat	  to	  American	  security.	  	  A	  split	  started	  to	  develop	  in	  the	  Joint	  Board	  between	  the	  Army	  representatives	  and	  the	  Navy	  representatives	  in	  the	  mid	  1930s.	  War	  in	  Asia	  resulted	  in	  the	  Navy	  taking	  the	  lead	  in	  military	  leadership.	  War	  in	  Europe	  resulted	  in	  the	  Army	  assuming	  command.	  A	  “classic	  example	  of	  bureaucratic	  politics”154	  divided	  the	  Joint	  Board	  along	  service	  lines	  and	  foreshadowed	  future	  arguments	  to	  come	  over	  war	  strategy.	  As	  of	  February	  1938,	  the	  Navy	  had	  the	  upper	  hand,	  and	  the	  revised	  Plan	  ORANGE	  called	  for	  a	  concentration	  on	  the	  Pacific,	  while	  remaining	  ready	  for	  war	  in	  the	  Atlantic.155	  The	  Army	  won	  a	  small	  victory	  in	  the	  revision	  because	  of	  the	  additional	  focus	  on	  Europe.	  Smith’s	  reports	  fueled	  speculation	  that	  Germany	  might	  soon	  replace	  Japan	  as	  the	  biggest	  threat	  to	  American	  security.	  Although	  Japan	  appeared	  as	  the	  most	  immediate	  threat,	  American	  military	  planners	  continued	  to	  fear	  an	  attack	  from	  Europe.	  	  	   Nine	  months	  later,	  Roosevelt	  requested	  that	  his	  military	  advisers	  go	  back	  to	  the	  drawing	  board	  and	  develop	  strategic	  plans	  in	  case	  of	  war	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	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Germany	  or	  Japan	  or	  both.	  Japan	  no	  longer	  stood	  as	  the	  only	  immediate	  threat	  to	  American	  security.	  Roosevelt	  recognized	  the	  increasingly	  aggressive	  policies	  of	  Germany	  and	  Japan	  and	  acknowledged	  potential	  conflicts	  between	  their	  interests	  and	  American	  interests.156	  The	  Joint	  Planning	  Committee	  assembled	  a	  report	  on	  the	  strategic	  concerns	  of	  the	  United	  States	  should	  war	  occur	  against	  Germany	  or	  Japan.	  Even	  Latin	  America	  emerged	  as	  a	  major	  concern.	  Contrary	  to	  the	  Monroe	  Doctrine,	  all	  three	  Axis	  powers,	  especially	  Germany,	  started	  to	  expand	  their	  presence	  and	  influence	  there.	  .157	  	  	   With	  the	  information	  gathered	  from	  the	  Joint	  Planning	  Committee	  report,	  military	  leaders	  produced	  the	  RAINBOW	  Plans	  for	  Roosevelt.	  The	  RAINBOW	  Plans	  accounted	  for	  five	  different	  possible	  war	  scenarios.	  A	  majority	  of	  the	  plans	  called	  for	  the	  defense	  of	  the	  Western	  Hemisphere	  against	  Axis	  nations	  attempting	  to	  violate	  the	  Monroe	  Doctrine,	  but	  two	  plans	  called	  for	  immediate	  offensive	  action.	  RAINBOW	  2	  involved	  working	  with	  Great	  Britain	  and	  France	  with	  “immediate	  offensive	  operations	  across	  the	  Pacific.”158	  RAINBOW	  5	  called	  for	  cooperation	  with	  Great	  Britain	  and	  France	  again,	  but	  with	  “early	  projection	  of	  U.S.	  forces	  to	  the	  eastern	  Atlantic”	  and	  the	  “defeat	  of	  Germany	  and	  Italy.”159	  RAINBOW	  5	  followed	  the	  example	  of	  Plan	  ORANGE-­‐RED	  and	  recognized	  Europe	  as	  the	  primary	  theater	  of	  war.	  A	  general	  consensus	  among	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Joint	  Planning	  Committee	  recognized	  Europe	  served	  more	  of	  the	  United	  States	  vital	  interests.	  If	  the	  Axis	  powers	  attacked	  simultaneously,	  Germany	  served	  as	  the	  biggest	  threat	  and	  needed	  to	  be	  taken	  out	  first.	  Unfortunately,	  the	  RAINBOW	  Plans	  “did	  not	  completely	  satisfy	  the	  Army	  or	  the	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Navy.”160	  The	  RAINBOW	  Plans	  needed	  to	  be	  revised	  and	  changed,	  but	  with	  no	  actual	  immediate	  threats	  to	  American	  security,	  Roosevelt	  and	  his	  military	  advisers	  left	  the	  RAINBOW	  Plans	  alone.	  	  	   The	  fall	  of	  France	  in	  1940	  and	  other	  developments	  in	  Europe	  and	  Asia	  pushed	  Roosevelt’s	  military	  advisers	  back	  into	  immediate	  action.	  Hitler	  controlled	  most	  of	  Europe,	  and	  the	  United	  States	  feared	  the	  Nazis	  desired	  to	  expand	  beyond	  the	  European	  continent.	  France’s	  navy	  no	  longer	  stood	  in	  the	  way	  of	  German	  submarines.	  In	  fact,	  American	  military	  strategists	  “had	  to	  contend	  with	  the	  possibility	  that	  Germany	  would	  gain	  control	  of	  the	  French	  Fleet.”161	  This	  would	  leave	  the	  British	  navy	  alone	  to	  combat	  German	  naval	  power	  in	  the	  Atlantic.	  	  	   Many	  government	  and	  military	  officials	  already	  expressed	  concern	  about	  “German	  infiltration	  of	  Central	  and	  South	  America”	  but	  the	  concern	  intensified	  in	  1940	  because	  of	  “Germany’s	  many	  military	  and	  trade	  missions	  in	  the	  region.”162	  They	  believed	  “Germany	  might	  acquire	  colonies	  and	  allies	  in	  the	  Western	  Hemisphere.”163	  A	  German-­‐controlled	  South	  America	  posed	  many	  threats	  to	  American	  security,	  especially	  concerning	  the	  Panama	  Canal.	  General	  George	  Marshall	  expressed	  serious	  warnings	  of	  a	  German	  “strike	  at	  the	  Panama	  Canal,	  ”164	  since	  the	  Canal	  served	  as	  the	  lifeline	  of	  the	  two-­‐ocean	  navy.	  Losing	  control	  of	  the	  Panama	  Canal	  would	  stifle	  American	  naval	  movement	  and	  hinder	  American	  trade.	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With	  a	  renewed	  focus	  on	  Germany	  as	  a	  major	  potential	  enemy,	  Admiral	  Harold	  Stark	  revised	  the	  Navy’s	  war	  plans.	  In	  November	  of	  1940,	  Stark	  produced	  the	  new	  plans	  now	  known	  as	  Plan	  DOG.	  Plan	  DOG	  laid	  the	  foundation	  for	  future	  American	  war	  strategy	  in	  World	  War	  II.	  Similar	  to	  the	  RAINBOW	  Plans,	  Plan	  DOG	  explored	  multiple	  military	  scenarios	  involving	  the	  United	  States	  fighting	  Japan,	  Germany	  or	  all	  the	  Axis	  powers	  at	  once.	  What	  set	  Plan	  DOG	  apart	  is	  Stark’s	  recognition	  that	  war	  with	  one	  Axis	  power	  would	  more	  than	  likely	  lead	  to	  war	  with	  all	  the	  Axis	  powers.	  The	  United	  States	  did	  not	  possess	  the	  military	  capabilities	  to	  launch	  two	  offensive	  fronts	  in	  separate	  parts	  of	  the	  world.	  The	  United	  States	  needed	  to	  place	  priority	  on	  one	  theater	  of	  war.	  	  In	  such	  an	  event,	  Stark	  gave	  his	  firm	  opinion	  in	  favor	  of	  pursuing	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy	  in	  what	  he	  called	  Alternative	  D.	  Alternative	  D	  called	  for	  the	  United	  States	  to	  “prepare,	  in	  case	  of	  war,	  for	  great	  land	  operations	  across	  the	  Atlantic.”165	  Such	  preparations	  consumed	  vast	  amounts	  of	  resources,	  resulting	  in	  the	  United	  States	  possessing	  the	  ability	  to	  fight	  an	  offensive	  battle	  in	  only	  one	  theater	  at	  a	  time.	  Stark	  stated	  that	  victory	  in	  Europe	  against	  Germany	  would	  “likely	  to	  be	  the	  most	  fruitful	  for	  the	  United	  States”166	  in	  defeating	  the	  Axis	  powers	  as	  a	  whole.	  According	  to	  his	  research,	  Stark	  believed	  defeating	  Germany	  first	  served	  American	  interests	  more	  effectively	  than	  any	  of	  the	  other	  alternatives.	  As	  part	  of	  his	  recommendation	  in	  Plan	  DOG,	  Stark	  provided	  two	  main	  arguments	  for	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy.	  First,	  Stark	  identified	  Hitler	  and	  the	  Nazis	  as	  the	  leader	  and	  most	  powerful	  of	  the	  Axis	  powers.	  The	  German	  war	  machine	  proved	  its	  strength	  and	  effectiveness	  through	  its	  European	  blitzkrieg.	  If	  the	  United	  States	  allowed	  Hitler	  to	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  Matloff,	  and	  Snell,	  Strategic	  Planning	  for	  Coalition	  Warfare,	  1941-­‐1942,	  26.	  166	  Harold	  Stark,	  “Plan	  DOG	  Memorandum,	  November	  12,	  1940”	  from	  Franklin	  D.	  Roosevelt	  Library	  and	  Museum,	  Safe	  Files,	  Box	  4,	  Navy	  Department	  “Plan	  DOG”	  Index,	  24.	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strengthen	  his	  hold	  over	  Europe	  by	  pursuing	  a	  Pacific-­‐first	  strategy,	  the	  chances	  for	  an	  American	  victory	  in	  Europe	  plummeted.	  In	  case	  of	  war,	  the	  United	  States	  needed	  to	  focus	  “full	  national	  offensive	  strength…in	  a	  single	  direction.”167	  For	  Stark,	  that	  single	  direction	  pointed	  to	  Berlin.	  The	  second	  reason	  involved	  allies.	  Stark	  stressed	  the	  strategic	  importance	  of	  protecting	  potential	  American	  allies	  from	  Germany.	  The	  United	  States	  could	  not	  win	  a	  two-­‐front	  war	  alone,	  and	  almost	  all	  of	  America’s	  potential	  allies	  were	  already	  under	  Nazi	  control	  or	  appeared	  ready	  to	  fall	  to	  the	  Germans.	  Plan	  Dog	  called	  for	  “a	  Germany-­‐	  first	  approach	  in	  conjunction	  with	  England,”168	  but	  such	  a	  plan	  could	  not	  exist	  without	  a	  free	  England.	  In	  fact,	  a	  majority	  of	  Stark’s	  military	  strategy	  in	  Plan	  DOG	  involved	  keeping	  Britain	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  Germany.169	  In	  order	  to	  have	  allies	  against	  Japan,	  the	  United	  States	  needed	  to	  place	  priority	  on	  supporting	  “Great	  Britain	  against	  its	  major	  enemy,”170	  which	  made	  Germany	  the	  United	  States	  major	  enemy.	  Stark	  also	  wanted	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  United	  States	  did	  not	  have	  to	  fight	  the	  Japanese	  alone	  in	  the	  future.	  Once	  Germany	  fell	  to	  the	  Allies,	  the	  United	  States	  could	  pursue	  an	  active	  war	  against	  Japan	  with	  help	  from	  the	  British	  and	  the	  Soviets.	  	   Originally,	  Secretary	  of	  War	  Henry	  Stimson	  supported	  a	  strong	  stance	  against	  Japan.	  He	  advised	  Roosevelt	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  Pacific	  and	  recognize	  Japanese	  aggression	  as	  more	  of	  an	  immediate	  threat	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  Growing	  German	  power	  and	  Stark’s	  Plan	  DOG	  memorandum	  caused	  him	  to	  change	  his	  opinion.	  He	  “agreed	  with	  the	  chiefs”171	  that	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  Stark,	  “Plan	  Dig	  Memorandum,”	  24.	  168	  Stoler,	  Allies	  and	  Adversaries,	  29.	  169	  Stark,	  “Plan	  Dig	  Memorandum,”	  2-­‐26.	  170	  Matloff,	  and	  Snell,	  Strategic	  Planning	  for	  Coalition	  Warfare,	  1941-­‐1942,	  27.	  171	  Stoler,	  Allies	  and	  Adversaries,	  35.	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Germany	  threatened	  American	  security	  more	  than	  Japan.	  Thereafter,	  Stimson	  advocated	  increasingly	  aggressive	  measures	  against	  the	  Nazis.	  One	  of	  these	  measures	  included	  American	  naval	  escorts	  of	  British	  ships	  operating	  under	  the	  Lend-­‐Lease	  Act.	  Along	  with	  Stark,	  he	  “proved	  to	  be	  the	  idea’s	  most	  relentless	  advocate.”172	  He	  called	  for	  “additional	  civil-­‐military	  coordination”173	  in	  order	  to	  settle	  on	  a	  final	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy	  for	  war.	  	  	   In	  1941,	  American	  military	  leaders	  continued	  to	  garner	  support	  for	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy.	  A	  secret	  meeting	  between	  American	  military	  officials	  and	  British	  military	  officials	  known	  as	  the	  ABC-­‐1	  Conference	  generated	  mutual	  support	  for	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy.	  At	  the	  ABC-­‐1	  conference,	  the	  delegation	  agreed	  that	  an	  Anglo-­‐American	  alliance’s	  “main	  effort	  would	  be	  against	  Germany	  rather	  than	  Japan,”174	  which	  aligned	  with	  the	  outline	  of	  RAINBOW	  5.	  After	  the	  secret	  ABC-­‐1	  Conference,	  the	  United	  States	  military	  made	  moves	  towards	  putting	  RAINBOW	  5	  into	  action.	  With	  “the	  eyes	  of	  American	  strategists…focused	  on	  the	  Atlantic,”175	  Marshall	  and	  Stimson	  oversaw	  preparations	  for	  transitioning	  from	  a	  Pacific	  orientation	  to	  the	  Europe	  orientation	  of	  RAINBOW	  5.	  These	  preparations	  included	  massive	  mobilization	  efforts	  in	  the	  United	  States	  in	  order	  to	  prepare	  the	  Army’s	  European	  invasion	  force	  required	  under	  RAINBOW	  5.176	  	  	   Pearl	  Harbor	  and	  the	  declarations	  of	  war	  against	  the	  United	  States	  by	  Japan	  and	  Germany	  definitely	  answered	  the	  questions	  on	  which	  members	  of	  the	  Axis	  powers	  the	  United	  States	  would	  fight	  in	  the	  war.	  The	  United	  States	  faced	  a	  two-­‐front	  war	  and	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  RAINBOW	  Plans	  no	  longer	  applied.	  Many	  of	  the	  United	  States	  military	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  Angry	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  173	  Stoler,	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  Adversaries,	  37.	  174	  Olson,	  Those	  Angry	  Days,	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  175	  Morton,	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  First,	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  176	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leaders	  decided	  to	  turn	  to	  RAINBOW	  5	  and	  Stark’s	  Plan	  DOG,	  but	  the	  division	  along	  Army	  and	  Navy	  lines	  reappeared	  in	  the	  ongoing	  strategy	  debates.	  The	  tentative	  agreement	  between	  the	  Army	  and	  Navy	  on	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy	  disintegrated.	  The	  leaders	  of	  the	  two	  branches	  of	  the	  United	  States	  military	  split	  mostly	  along	  service	  lines	  with	  the	  Army	  preferring	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy	  and	  the	  Navy	  favoring	  a	  Pacific-­‐first	  strategy.	  Some	  leaders	  held	  different	  opinions,	  such	  as	  General	  Douglas	  MacArthur	  and	  Stark,	  but	  most	  of	  the	  leaders	  stayed	  loyal	  to	  the	  other	  service	  heads.	  	  	   Prestige	  served	  as	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  stark	  difference	  in	  opinion	  between	  the	  Army	  and	  Navy.	  In	  Europe,	  the	  Army	  clearly	  needed	  to	  be	  in	  control	  because	  a	  war	  against	  Germany	  required	  a	  massive	  land	  invasion.	  The	  Army	  would	  receive	  all	  the	  praise	  and	  press	  attention	  back	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  This	  would	  help	  cement	  their	  position	  of	  power	  in	  the	  White	  House.	  In	  the	  Pacific	  Theater,	  the	  Navy	  needed	  to	  take	  the	  reins	  because	  almost	  every	  battle	  would	  either	  be	  at	  sea	  or	  involve	  naval	  bombardment	  followed	  by	  United	  States	  Marines	  charging	  the	  beach.	  This	  would	  result	  in	  the	  Navy	  earning	  increased	  admiration	  among	  the	  American	  public	  and	  provide	  the	  Navy	  with	  the	  rare	  opportunity	  to	  “replace	  Army	  influence	  in	  the	  White	  House	  with	  that	  of	  the	  Navy.”177	  Neither	  branch	  of	  the	  military	  wanted	  the	  other	  to	  gain	  the	  upper	  hand	  and	  win	  more	  favor	  with	  the	  American	  public	  and	  more	  importantly	  the	  White	  House.	  	  	   An	  eagerness	  for	  revenge	  against	  the	  Japanese	  by	  the	  Navy	  was	  another	  reason	  for	  the	  split	  in	  opinion	  over	  strategy.	  The	  Navy	  wanted	  the	  United	  States	  to	  follow	  a	  Pacific-­‐first	  strategy	  in	  order	  to	  engage	  the	  Imperial	  Navy	  of	  Japan	  as	  soon	  as	  possible.	  The	  United	  States	  Navy	  lost	  many	  good	  sailors	  and	  ships	  at	  Pearl	  Harbor.	  “Desirous	  of	  revenge	  for	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  Mark	  Stoler,	  The	  Politics	  of	  the	  Second	  Front:	  American	  Military	  Planning	  and	  Diplomacy	  
in	  Coalition	  Warfare,	  1941-­‐1943	  (Westport,	  CT:	  Greenwood	  Press,	  1977),	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Pearl	  Harbor,”178	  the	  survivors	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Navy	  craved	  an	  opportunity	  to	  avenge	  their	  comrades’	  deaths.	  Historian	  Mark	  Stoler	  suggests	  that	  the	  United	  States	  Navy	  demanded	  “further	  action	  in	  the	  Pacific,”179	  despite	  of	  the	  Roosevelt	  Administration’s	  decision	  to	  concentrate	  on	  Hitler,	  Nazi	  Germany	  and	  Europe.	  The	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy	  needed	  to	  be	  finalized	  as	  quickly	  as	  possible	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  the	  United	  States	  Navy	  from	  pushing	  harder	  for	  more	  action	  against	  Japan	  in	  the	  Pacific.	  	  	   The	  major	  players	  in	  deciding	  American	  military	  strategy	  stood	  divided	  after	  the	  Japanese	  attack	  on	  Pearl	  Harbor	  and	  the	  Japanese	  expulsion	  of	  American	  troops	  from	  the	  Philippines.	  Many	  of	  the	  generals	  and	  admirals	  of	  the	  United	  States	  military	  held	  complicated	  views	  on	  which	  war	  strategy	  best	  suited	  American	  interests.	  Beyond	  prestige	  and	  revenge,	  American	  military	  leaders	  could	  not	  agree	  on	  which	  Axis	  power	  threatened	  the	  United	  States	  the	  most	  and	  deserved	  priority.	  In	  order	  to	  reach	  a	  resolution	  on	  American	  military	  strategy	  and	  mirror	  the	  British	  Imperial	  General	  Staff,	  the	  United	  States	  military	  replaced	  the	  weak	  Joint	  Board	  with	  a	  more	  organized	  group	  of	  commanders	  known	  as	  the	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff.	  Created	  in	  1942,	  the	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  was	  comprised	  of	  Marshall,	  United	  States	  Army	  Air	  Forces	  Chief	  General	  Henry	  Arnold,	  United	  States	  Chief	  of	  Naval	  Operations	  Admiral	  Ernest	  King	  and	  Admiral	  William	  Leahy.	  They	  served	  as	  the	  main	  strategists	  for	  the	  United	  States	  and	  possessed	  significant	  influence	  on	  Roosevelt’s	  war	  decisions.	  180	  Stark,	  MacArthur	  and	  General	  Dwight	  D.	  Eisenhower,	  also	  influenced	  American	  strategic	  decisions.	  Together,	  these	  seven	  men	  played	  some	  of	  the	  most	  pivotal	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roles	  in	  helping	  Roosevelt	  determine	  that	  the	  United	  States	  must	  pursue	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy	  in	  World	  War	  II.	  Marshall	  definitely	  held	  the	  most	  sway	  with	  Roosevelt.	  He	  earned	  “the	  esteem	  of	  Roosevelt”181	  and	  as	  the	  Chief	  of	  Staff	  of	  the	  Army,	  talked	  with	  him	  almost	  daily.	  Marshall	  was	  committed	  to	  the	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy	  since	  before	  the	  war.	  In	  fact,	  when	  he	  first	  became	  the	  Chief	  of	  Staff	  of	  the	  Army	  in	  1939,	  he	  outlined	  a	  series	  of	  measures	  the	  Army	  needed	  to	  take	  “upon	  the	  outbreak	  of	  a	  war	  in	  Europe,”182	  and	  he	  aimed	  at	  Germany.	  	  A	  major	  part	  of	  Marshall’s	  strategy	  required	  a	  large	  Allied	  invasion	  of	  northwestern	  Europe	  to	  liberate	  France	  and	  relieve	  Russia	  in	  the	  east.	  Only	  a	  massive	  attack	  in	  Western	  Europe	  could	  bring	  down	  the	  Germans,	  save	  American	  allies,	  and	  eventually	  defeat	  all	  the	  Axis	  powers.	  Marshall	  had	  little	  patience	  for	  the	  British-­‐planned	  Operation	  GYMNAST	  and	  believed	  it	  “would	  be	  both	  indecisive	  and	  a	  heavy	  drain	  on	  our	  resources.”183	  He	  believed	  so	  strongly	  in	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy	  that	  he	  issued	  a	  memorandum	  to	  Roosevelt	  in	  1942.	  In	  the	  memorandum,	  Marshall	  stated	  that	  unless	  the	  United	  States	  pursued	  plans	  involving	  large-­‐scale	  invasions	  of	  Europe,	  then	  “we	  should	  turn	  to	  the	  Pacific	  and	  strike	  decisively	  against	  Japan.”184	  A	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy	  was	  best,	  but	  Marshall	  tired	  of	  the	  Allies’	  indecision.	  Roosevelt	  rejected	  Marshall’s	  suggestion,	  but	  understood	  his	  standpoint.	  This	  memorandum	  supported	  Operation	  BOLERO,	  which	  called	  for	  a	  buildup	  of	  supplies	  and	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men	  in	  England.185	  Operation	  BOLERO	  would	  allow	  a	  grand	  Channel	  crossing	  into	  German	  occupied	  France	  by	  Allied	  forces,	  which	  eventually	  turned	  into	  Operation	  OVERLORD.	  	  Arnold’s	  expertise	  involved	  air	  power,	  which	  caused	  him	  to	  view	  Germany	  as	  the	  most	  powerful	  member	  of	  the	  Axis	  Power.	  As	  the	  head	  of	  the	  Army	  Air	  Forces,	  Arnold	  understood	  the	  strategic	  importance	  of	  air	  superiority.	  He	  personally	  witnessed	  the	  power	  of	  the	  Luftwaffe	  during	  the	  Battle	  of	  Britain	  in	  London:	  	  “A	  fire	  here,	  another	  there,	  they	  seem	  to	  cover	  as	  much	  as	  a	  city	  block.”186	  After	  his	  experiences	  in	  England,	  Arnold	  realized	  the	  United	  States	  needed	  to	  build	  a	  powerful	  air	  force.	  He	  helped	  change	  Roosevelt’s	  mind	  about	  air	  power	  and	  advised	  him	  to	  greatly	  expand	  the	  Army	  Air	  Forces.	  Known	  for	  his	  “driving	  energy,”187	  he	  helped	  develop	  the	  United	  States	  Army	  Air	  Forces	  into	  a	  rival	  force	  to	  the	  Luftwaffe.	  Historian	  and	  author	  Eric	  Larrabee	  agrees	  and	  mentions	  that	  Arnold	  “fathered	  the	  American	  air	  force”188	  in	  response	  to	  Germany’s	  growing	  power.	  	  Along	  with	  establishing	  the	  United	  States	  as	  a	  formidable	  air	  power,	  Arnold	  served	  as	  a	  staunch	  supporter	  of	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy,	  a	  conviction	  that	  put	  him	  into	  conflict	  with	  King.	  Arnold	  firmly	  believed	  that	  the	  United	  States	  needed	  to	  save	  the	  British	  and	  Soviets	  from	  the	  Nazis,189	  because	  there	  was	  no	  hope	  of	  winning	  the	  war	  alone.	  King	  held	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little	  regard	  for	  Arnold	  and	  viewed	  him	  as	  unqualified	  for	  his	  position.190	  Arnold	  refused	  to	  be	  pushed	  around	  by	  King	  and	  held	  firm	  to	  his	  defense	  of	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy.	  	  	   King	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  an	  extremely	  vocal	  leader	  in	  the	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff.	  He	  believed	  Japan	  stood	  as	  the	  largest	  threat	  to	  American	  security	  and	  needed	  to	  be	  dealt	  with	  immediately.	  In	  1942,	  King	  begged	  for	  more	  troops	  and	  ships	  in	  the	  Pacific	  in	  order	  to	  not	  only	  “stem	  the	  Japanese	  advance	  but	  also	  to	  launch	  counterattacks.”191	  A	  strong	  thirst	  for	  revenge	  along	  with	  a	  racist	  attitude	  towards	  the	  Japanese	  drove	  King	  in	  his	  quest	  to	  end	  Japanese	  aggression	  in	  the	  Pacific.	  192	  In	  a	  1942	  memorandum	  to	  Roosevelt,	  King	  insisted	  that	  the	  United	  States	  needed	  to	  save	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand	  from	  the	  Japanese	  because	  of	  the	  “repercussions	  among	  the	  non-­‐white	  races	  of	  the	  world.”	  193	  Roosevelt,	  however,	  largely	  ignored	  King’s	  plea.	  	  	  After	  Marshall,	  Leahy	  was	  one	  of	  Roosevelt’s	  closest	  friends	  and	  confidents.	  The	  two	  met	  prior	  to	  World	  War	  I	  and	  worked	  together	  in	  the	  United	  States	  Navy.	  During	  Roosevelt’s	  second	  term,	  they	  worked	  together	  as	  the	  United	  States	  military	  “began	  to	  gird	  for	  war.”194	  Leahy	  retired	  in	  1939,	  but	  Roosevelt	  called	  him	  back	  into	  service	  during	  World	  War	  II.	  He	  appointed	  Leahy	  as	  the	  Chief	  of	  Staff	  to	  the	  Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief.	  Leahy	  did	  not	  actively	  press	  for	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  or	  a	  Pacific-­‐first	  strategy,	  but	  mainly	  served	  as	  a	  “stabilizing	  influence	  to	  sessions	  of	  the	  Combined	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff.”195	  He	  worked	  especially	  well	  as	  “an	  effective	  mediator	  of	  differences	  of	  opinion	  that	  arose	  between	  Marshall	  and	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King.”196	  Everyone	  on	  the	  Combined	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  “respected	  him	  highly	  as	  the	  president’s	  personal	  spokesman,”197	  including	  foreign	  military	  officials.	  When	  forced	  to	  share	  his	  opinion,	  however,	  Leahy	  tended	  to	  support	  a	  Pacific-­‐first	  strategy.198Roosevelt	  appreciated	  the	  friendship	  and	  hard	  work	  of	  Leahy	  throughout	  World	  War	  II.	  Though	  extremely	  influential	  with	  Roosevelt,	  Leahy’s	  position	  required	  him	  to	  serve	  as	  less	  of	  a	  strategist	  and	  as	  more	  of	  a	  mediator.	  	  Stark	  already	  played	  a	  large	  role	  in	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy.	  In	  his	  1940	  Plan	  DOG	  memorandum	  to	  Roosevelt,	  Stark	  fully	  committed	  to	  tackling	  the	  German	  problem	  before	  going	  on	  the	  offensive	  against	  Japan.	  He	  realized	  “the	  continued	  existence	  of	  the	  British	  Empire”199	  was	  absolutely	  vital	  to	  the	  security	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  aspects	  of	  any	  United	  States	  war	  plan.	  After	  the	  United	  States	  officially	  entered	  the	  war,	  Stark	  remained	  a	  vocal	  advocate	  of	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy.	  Roosevelt	  promoted	  Stark	  to	  his	  position	  as	  Chief	  of	  Naval	  Operations	  and	  placed	  great	  trust	  in	  Stark’s	  decision-­‐making	  skills.200Throughout	  the	  ARCADIA	  Conference	  in	  late	  December	  1941,	  Stark	  defended	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy	  against	  his	  American	  peers.201	  He	  worked	  in	  collaboration	  with	  British	  military	  officials	  to	  convince	  other	  American	  officers	  that	  Germany	  needed	  to	  be	  dealt	  with	  first.	  	  MacArthur	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  just	  as	  loud	  or	  even	  louder	  leader	  than	  King.	  He	  greatly	  desired	  a	  Pacific-­‐first	  strategy	  because	  he	  made	  a	  vow	  to	  return	  to	  the	  Philippines	  and	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liberate	  it	  from	  the	  Japanese.	  MacArthur	  cared	  deeply	  about	  his	  reputation	  and	  wanted	  to	  avenge	  his	  earlier	  defeat	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Japanese.	  He	  also	  spent	  most	  of	  his	  military	  career	  in	  the	  Pacific	  and	  knew	  that	  he	  would	  be	  most	  useful	  in	  the	  Pacific	  Theater	  of	  World	  War	  II.	  He	  repeatedly	  stressed	  “the	  importance	  of	  the	  Pacific”202	  to	  his	  superiors,	  especially	  Roosevelt.	  MacArthur	  hated	  being	  told	  no	  and	  often	  overstepped	  his	  boundaries	  as	  a	  military	  man.	  This	  resulted	  in	  constant	  criticism	  from	  people	  of	  higher	  authority,	  especially	  Roosevelt.	  One	  incident	  over	  U.S.	  Army	  budget	  cuts	  resulted	  in	  Roosevelt	  turning	  “livid	  with	  rage”203	  and	  MacArthur	  offering	  his	  resignation.	  Roosevelt	  did	  not	  fire	  MacArthur,	  but	  the	  incident	  showed	  MacArthur’s	  arrogant	  obsession	  with	  a	  Pacific-­‐first	  strategy.	  Eisenhower	  shared	  Marshall’s	  commitment	  to	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy	  and	  actively	  fought	  for	  American	  military	  action	  against	  Germany.	  He	  served	  under	  MacArthur	  in	  the	  Philippines	  and	  understood	  fairly	  well	  the	  threat	  the	  Japanese	  Imperial	  Military	  posed	  to	  American	  interests	  in	  the	  Pacific,	  but	  he	  still	  viewed	  Germany	  as	  the	  larger	  threat.	  In	  fact,	  Eisenhower	  wrote	  “the	  basic	  strategy	  of	  a	  European	  war”204	  in	  1942	  at	  the	  request	  of	  Marshall.	  From	  a	  logistical	  point	  of	  view,	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy	  made	  more	  sense	  than	  a	  Pacific-­‐first	  strategy.	  He	  concluded	  that	  it	  would	  take	  “three	  to	  four	  times	  as	  many	  ships	  to	  transport	  and	  maintain	  a	  force	  in	  the	  Pacific	  as	  across	  the	  Atlantic.”205	  By	  the	  time	  the	  United	  States	  developed	  the	  logistical	  capability	  to	  win	  in	  the	  Pacific,	  the	  Soviets	  and	  possibly	  the	  British	  may	  already	  have	  fallen	  to	  the	  Germans,	  which	  eliminated	  practically	  all	  of	  the	  United	  States’	  allies.	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Germany’s	  status	  as	  the	  most	  powerful	  of	  the	  Axis	  powers	  served	  as	  another	  reason	  for	  Eisenhower’s	  desire	  to	  eliminate	  the	  Nazis	  first.	  With	  a	  majority	  of	  Allied	  military	  power	  already	  in	  Europe,	  the	  Allies	  could	  launch	  a	  greater	  attack	  on	  Germany	  than	  on	  Japan.206	  Removing	  the	  Germans	  from	  the	  war	  created	  an	  opportunity	  to	  redirect	  all	  of	  the	  Allies	  military	  might	  against	  Japan	  in	  the	  future.	  The	  strategy	  for	  war	  in	  Europe	  that	  Eisenhower	  wrote	  greatly	  helped	  Roosevelt	  make	  the	  decision	  to	  pick	  Eisenhower	  as	  the	  Supreme	  Commander	  of	  Allied	  forces	  in	  the	  European	  Theater	  of	  World	  War	  II.	  Marshall	  and	  Roosevelt	  valued	  Eisenhower’s	  quick	  mind	  and	  trusted	  him	  to	  make	  the	  proper	  decisions	  necessary	  to	  defeat	  Nazi	  Germany	  and	  win	  the	  war	  in	  Europe.	  	  	  	   Overall,	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  military	  advisors	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Army	  and	  United	  States	  Navy	  supported	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy	  over	  a	  Pacific-­‐first	  strategy.	  Since	  Germany	  began	  to	  rearm	  in	  the	  1930s,	  American	  military	  personnel	  cautiously	  watched	  Hitler	  and	  his	  military	  ambitions.	  A	  Nazi-­‐dominated	  Europe	  strategically	  hurt	  the	  United	  States	  more	  than	  a	  Japanese-­‐dominated	  Pacific.	  Marshall,	  Arnold,	  Stark	  and	  Eisenhower	  realized	  the	  strategic	  importance	  of	  saving	  American	  allies	  from	  the	  clutches	  of	  Hitler	  and	  his	  Nazi	  war	  machine.	  King,	  Leahy	  and	  MacArthur	  advocated	  for	  a	  Pacific-­‐first	  strategy,	  but	  Roosevelt	  believed	  that	  they	  allowed	  their	  personal	  emotions	  and	  feelings	  to	  cloud	  their	  judgment.	  Extensive	  research	  from	  the	  Army	  and	  Navy	  caused	  the	  military	  strategists	  to	  conclude	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy	  was	  the	  best	  plan	  of	  attack.	  Based	  off	  of	  the	  advice	  of	  the	  various	  leaders	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Army	  and	  United	  States	  Navy,	  Roosevelt	  made	  the	  logical	  choice	  of	  pursuing	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy.	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Conclusion	  	   Henry	  Luce	  warned	  the	  American	  public	  in	  1941	  that	  if	  the	  United	  States	  did	  not	  directly	  enter	  the	  war	  against	  the	  Nazis,	  the	  world	  would	  	  “flounder	  for	  ten	  or	  20	  or	  30	  bitter	  years	  in	  a	  chartless	  and	  meaningless	  series	  of	  disasters.”207	  Hitler	  and	  his	  followers	  unleashed	  a	  wave	  of	  cruelty	  against	  people	  on	  a	  level	  rarely	  matched	  in	  human	  history	  in	  the	  short	  amount	  of	  time	  they	  held	  power	  in	  Europe.	  Millions	  of	  Jews,	  Romanis,	  homosexuals	  and	  other	  groups	  of	  people	  deemed	  undesirable	  perished	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Nazis.	  One	  cannot	  begin	  to	  imagine	  the	  terrible	  atrocities	  Hitler	  and	  the	  Nazis	  would	  have	  committed	  if	  they	  endured	  for	  another	  30	  years.	  	  In	  1945,	  the	  United	  States	  Army	  released	  a	  newsreel	  entitled	  “Death	  Mills”	  in	  order	  to	  educate	  the	  public	  about	  the	  horrific	  treatment	  and	  extermination	  of	  Jews	  in	  Nazi	  occupied	  territories.	  The	  documentary	  followed	  the	  American	  liberation	  of	  concentration	  camps	  in	  Germany.	  Ohrdruf	  was	  the	  first	  concentration	  camp	  liberated	  by	  American	  soldiers,	  but	  more	  followed.	  High-­‐ranking	  American	  military	  officials	  such	  as	  Eisenhower,	  General	  George	  S.	  Patton	  and	  General	  Omar	  Bradley	  visited	  the	  camps.208	  Men	  who	  witnessed	  the	  carnage	  of	  war	  were	  shaken	  by	  the	  complete	  disregard	  for	  the	  sanctity	  of	  life	  shown	  by	  the	  Nazis.	  	   The	  newsreel	  reveals	  the	  horrifying	  images	  the	  soldiers	  encountered	  in	  the	  camps.	  Mass	  graves	  filled	  with	  broken	  bodies	  existed	  at	  every	  camp.	  In	  many	  camps,	  the	  dead	  lay	  unburied	  and	  scattered	  throughout	  the	  area.	  The	  bodies	  showed	  clear	  evidence	  of	  starvation	  and	  abuse.	  Putrid	  smells	  of	  rotting	  flesh	  dominated	  the	  area.	  The	  Nazis	  covered	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the	  bodies	  in	  lime	  to	  help	  with	  decomposition.209	  Soldiers	  could	  not	  believe	  what	  they	  saw	  in	  the	  camps.	  	   The	  footage	  of	  Buchenwald	  proved	  especially	  devastating.	  Only	  20,000	  of	  the	  original	  80,000	  prisoners	  were	  found	  alive.210	  Soldiers	  discovered	  that	  the	  Germans	  tattooed	  serial	  numbers	  on	  the	  prisoners	  like	  farmers	  brand	  cattle.	  Kilns	  filled	  with	  torched	  human	  bones	  proved	  unnerving	  and	  absolutely	  terrifying.	  The	  narrator	  reported	  on	  the	  “world’s	  disgust	  at	  Germany’s	  organized	  carnage.”211	  Many	  of	  those	  found	  alive	  in	  the	  camps	  were	  beyond	  medical	  help,	  	   Video	  footage	  of	  the	  concentration	  camps	  provided	  undeniable	  proof	  of	  the	  evil	  actions	  of	  the	  Nazis.	  Americans	  had	  heard	  rumors	  of	  the	  atrocities	  committed	  in	  Germany-­‐controlled	  Europe,	  but	  many	  hoped	  the	  stories	  were	  not	  true.	  Americans	  entered	  World	  War	  II	  to	  stop	  Germany	  in	  Europe,	  but	  the	  discovery	  of	  the	  concentration	  camps	  confirmed	  that	  the	  United	  States	  did	  not	  make	  a	  mistake	  by	  entering	  the	  war	  and	  eliminating	  the	  Nazis	  first.	  Stopping	  Hitler	  first	  allowed	  the	  Allies	  to	  prevent	  the	  Nazis	  from	  continuing	  and	  expanding	  their	  heinous	  crimes	  against	  humanity.	  A	  Pacific	  first	  strategy	  may	  have	  allowed	  the	  Nazis	  to	  continue	  their	  terrible	  crimes	  for	  a	  few	  more	  years.	  Public	  opinion,	  foreign	  relations	  and	  military	  strategists	  all	  hold	  valuable	  roles	  in	  determining	  war	  strategy.	  Roosevelt	  relied	  on	  each	  of	  these	  factors	  in	  order	  to	  decide	  that	  the	  United	  States	  needed	  to	  implement	  a	  Europe-­‐first	  strategy	  in	  World	  War	  II.	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